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Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers
Confuse Custom and Reason?
James Q. Whitmant
Let the bar proclaim, "the laws, the rights, the generous plan
of power" delivered down from remote antiquity .... Let
them search for the foundations of British laws and govern-
ment in the frame of human nature, in the constitution of the
intellectual and moral world.'
John Adams (1765)
I recalled the method practiced once upon a time by M.
Descartes to arrive at the philosophical verities he sought; and
I persuaded myself that the. Jurist could do the same in order
to discover the verities of Justice .... If one were to compare
the various customs [of France], one would be in a position to
form a Plan of Universal Jurisprudence ....
Louis Boullenois (1732)
It is absolutely necessary that the national constitution be re-
duced to evident, brief principles .... For where the constitu-
tion has not been made evident, everything simply retains the
shape given it by custom, [from] pre-literate times . . . and
only a couple of dozen historical-critical minds will be inter-
ested in it .. .
Ludwig Timotheus von Spittler (1796)
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The first of the three passages above was written in colonial
America, on the eve of the Revolution; the second, in France, on
the eve of the French Enlightenment; and the third, in the Wtirt-
temberg of the young Hegel. All three show the same belief, even if
expressed in different words: the belief that custom could be, and
indeed must be, "reduced" to principles of reason. All three dis-
play the habit B.F. Wright saw as typical only of revolutionary
America: the "somewhat unclear mingling of the divine law, the
law of reason, and the principles of the ... Constitution. '4
That "somewhat unclear mingling" of reason, custom, and
constitution, is my subject in this Article. This Article offers a gen-
eral historical account of how the constitutionalist lawyers of the
eighteenth-century world came to mingle ideas of customary right
with characteristically eighteenth-century ideas of deductive natu-
ral law.5 To understand this tendency to conflate custom and rea-
son, I will suggest, we must understand developments that long
predated the passages quoted above. The eighteenth-century con-
stitutionalist habit of identifying custom with reason should be
traced back to the collapse of customary proof practices at the end
of the Medieval period-a collapse with a long train of institu-
tional and ideological consequences.
In making my argument, I will range widely over both Anglo-
American and Continental legal traditions. But my principal goal
is to prove two points about the legal legacy of the American
Revolution. First, I want to demonstrate that the legal culture of
eighteenth-century America belongs in a broad international con-
text. The peculiar patterns of thought that characterized the
American lawyers of the revolutionary era were also the peculiar
patterns of thought that characterized the lawyers of continental
Europe. Odd as it may sound, the same pressures and traditions
that produced John Adams also, to some extent, produced Hegel.
4 Benjamin Fletcher Wright, The Early History of Written Constitutions in America,
in Carl Wittke, ed, Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard
McIlwain 341, 360 (Russell & Russell, 1967).
5 I should emphasize here that the confusion I trace is between custom and deductive
natural law thought; indeed, throughout, by "natural law," I mean exclusively "deductive
natural law." It is this that distinguishes the tradition I discuss here from the medieval
practice of calling custom a form of "second nature." See Donald Kelley, "Second Nature":
The Idea of Custom in European Law, Society, and Culture, in Anthony Grafton and Ann
Blair, eds, The Transmission of Culture in Early Modern Europe 131 (Pennsylvania, 1990);
Donald R. Kelley, The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition
(Harvard, 1990). See also note 111 and accompanying text.
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Second, and more important, I want to raise some necessary
doubts in the minds of scholars of the American Revolution, who
have not quite faced the historical problems presented by the
"mingling" jurisprudence of the eighteenth century. For genera-
tions, Americanists have debated whether the legal thinking of the
American Revolutionaries was "about" custom or "about" deduc-
tive natural law. Legal historians once widely assumed that the
Revolution was instigated, and the Constitution ratified, by law-
yers who were somehow motivated by a belief in deductive natural
law.' More recently, historians have tended to suppose that com-
mon law tradition, or customary law tradition, or some mixture of
the two described by the catch-phrase "Rights of Englishmen,"
was the motivating force. 7 Both of these lines of interpretation at-
tribute much more coherence and intelligibility to revolutionary
era legal writings than those writings possess.8 Revolutionary era
lawyers unreflectively conflated reason and custom-which means
that, in many respects, we can never draw definitive conclusions
about constitutional interpretation from their writings.
The Sections that follow will trace the roots of eighteenth-cen-
tury jurisprudence in an international legal history stretching back
to the Dark Ages. Section I will review the pattern of "mingling"
custom and reason that characterized legal writings of the Ameri-
can revolutionary era. Section II will proceed to identify the histor-
ical origin of this pattern. Part A of Section II will describe a criti-
cal procedural practice in the Middle Ages: the interviewing of
local witnesses to determine local custom. Part B will show how
the early modern period witnessed an evidentiary crisis of custom,
as increasingly centralized court systems proved unable to ascer-
tain local custom. Part C will describe how Continental lawyers in
the seventeenth century struggled to fill the gaps in the customary
system of proof with principles of natural law and reason. As a
result, Part C will show, the European legal literature of that pe-
riod often invoked a confusing mix of "customary common law"
and "reason." Part D will describe how English jurists in the sev-
enteenth century confused reason and custom much as their Conti-
nental counterparts did.
' See text accompanying notes 25-26.
7 See text accompanying notes 27-29.
8 Even works that recognize the coexistence of these two discourses, I will argue, attrib-
ute more jurisprudential intelligibility to American legal writings than is appropriate. For
such works, see note 19 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Section III will show how the evidentiary crisis of cus-
tom led to the mingling of custom and reason characteristic of the
jurisprudence of the American revolutionary era. That jurispru-
dence was borrowed from the writings of the seventeenth century,
by American lawyers who did not understand the institutional con-
text of the ideas they repeated, and who had lost sight of the sev-
enteenth-century concepts of reason. As a result, revolutionary era
concepts such as "rights" and "constitution" lack fundamental ju-
risprudential intelligibility; literature that purports to explain
those concepts can never be satisfactory.9
I should say at the outset that the interpretation I will offer
will sweep very broadly over European history-more broadly than
most historians would be willing to sweep, and in a more essay-like
fashion. Nevertheless, I hope to win over European legal historians
at least tentatively to my view. As for American legal historians
and lawyers, I hope to convince them that understanding the juris-
prudence of the American revolutionary requires, in the last analy-
sis, a wide acquaintance with a great deal of western legal history.
1. "MINGLING" CUSTOM AND REASON IN THE REvOLUTIONARY ERA
When the first Continental Congress gathered in Philadelphia,
wrote John Adams in his diary, "[one of t]he two points which la-
bored the most [was w]hether we should recur to the law of nature,
as well as to the British constitution, and our American charters
and grants. Mr. Galloway and Mr. Duane were for excluding the
law of nature. I was very strenuous for retaining and insisting on it
...."o Behind this disagreement over the importance of "the law
of nature" lay generations of uncertainty.
Legal thought among the American revolutionary lawyers
presented a picture of apparent intellectual chaos, drawn from a
variegated mass of traditions. When the Revolution began, the
mental world of American lawyers was made up of a flourishing
variety of inconsistent jurisprudential systems, irreconcilable as-
sumptions, and mismatched intellectual inheritances. Ideas of nat-
ural law taken from such Enlightenment vulgarizers as Vattel and
Burlamaqui11 coexisted, in colonial minds, with the subtleties of
9 See note 170 and accompanying text.
10 John Adams, Diary, in 2 The Works of John Adams 1, 374 (Charles C. Little and
James Brown, 1850). See the discussion of Adams in Edward Corwin, The "Higher Law"
Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 Harv L Rev 365, 400-01 (1929). For the
Declaration this ultimately produced, see Wright, The Early History of Written Constitu-
tions at 360 (cited in note 4).
11 For the popularity of Burlamaqui, see Benjamin Fletcher Wright, American Inter-
pretations of Natural Law: A Study in the History of Political Thought 8 (Russell & Rus-
sell, 1962). For Vattel, see id at 67, 79, 129, 237.
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Montesquieu and Coke.12 If American lawyers all endorsed the
common law, it is hardly clear that they all conceived of the com-
mon law in the same way, for they received widely varying train-
ing.13 If admiration for the English constitution was universal, it is
unclear what shape the English constitution had in American
minds. 4
The apparent disorder was worst in the many writings that
commingled talk of "natural law" or the "law of reason" with talk
of the English constitution and customary law. Prime among such
passages familiar to eighteenth-century readers was Bolingbroke's
famous and influential statement:
By constitution we mean, whenever we speak with propriety
and exactness, that assemblage of laws, institutions, and cus-
toms, derived from certain fixed principles of reason, directed
to certain fixed objects of public good, that compose the gen-
eral system, according to which the community hath agreed to
be governed. 15
This passage captures the apparent lack of order in Anglo-Ameri-
can legal writing of the eighteenth century. What did Bolingbroke
mean? Why should "laws, institutions and customs" be "derived
from... fixed principles of reason" and how had any the commu-
nity consented to be governed either by reason or by custom? Bol-
ingbroke gave no answer. Neither did Blackstone, whose ability to
speak simultaneously of custom and reason continues to trouble
scholars." And neither did the American lawyers who quoted Bol-
'2 For the influence of Montesquieu in America, see id at 44, 89. In Europe, DeLolme
ranked alongside Montesquieu as an expositor of the British constitution, and eighteenth-
century editions of his work are quite numerous in American libraries. I do not know what
influence DeLolme had in America.
"S See Ernest Barker, Natural Law and the American Revolution, in Traditions of Ci-
vility: Eight Essays 263, 266-68 (Archon, 1967); David A. Lockmiller, Sir William Black-
stone 169-90 (North Carolina, 1938); Dennis Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New
American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 NYU L Rev 731 (1976); Julius Goe-
bel, The Common Law and the Constitution, in W. Melville Jones, ed, Chief Justice John
Marshall: A Reappraisal 101, 109 (Cornell, 1956); R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Jus-
tice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic 41-43 (North Carolina, 1985).
", See Jack P. Greene, From the Perspective of Law: Context and Legitimacy in the
Origins of the American Revolution, 85 S Atlantic Q 56, 57 (1987).
" Lord Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, in 2 The Works of Lord Bolingbroke
88 (Henry G. Bohn, 1844). For the influence of this passage, see Charles H. McIlwain, Con-
stitutionalism, Ancient and Modern 5 (Cornell, 1940); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of
the American Republic, 1776-1787 260-61 (Norton, 1969).
11 See David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in
Eighteenth-Century Britain 44-45 (Cambridge, 1989).
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ingbroke and Blackstone, and who spoke in similar terms. We may
well puzzle, for example, over the Massachusetts Circular Letter of
1768, which identified "the fundamental rules of the British consti-
tution" with "an essential, unalterable right, in nature . . ,.
What sort of jurisprudence could provoke this faintly comical iden-
tification of the constitution of England with the laws of Eternity?
What sort of suppositions underlay Alexander Hamilton's or Rich-
ard Bland's similar statements?""
It is, to be sure, possible to imagine sophisticated jurispruden-
tial arguments that could make sense of these passages. In particu-
lar, one might be able to reconcile custom with reason by thinking
of "reason" as "practical reason" or "wisdom." "Practical reason"
of this pragmatic kind would be a body of sound principles re-
vealed through the lived experience of custom. Indeed, a number
of scholars have argued that the best of common law theory down
through the ages has offered precisely this kind of sophisticated
reconciliation of custom and reason.1 9 But the bulk of revolution-
ary era passages show little evidence of such a sophisticated con-
cept of "reason."20 On the contrary, these writings often speak of
"reason" as a body of "fixed principles," of "immutable maxims of
reason and justice" to be discovered through deductive thought,
not through lived experience.2 The revolutionary lawyers, far from
embracing any pragmatic concept of "reason," generally embraced
a deductive, post-Cartesian variety.22 And such a deductive con-
17 Corwin, 42 Harv L Rev at 400 (cited in note 10) (quoting MacDonald, Documentary
Source Book 146-50 (1768)).
18 "Bland is not content to rely upon the principles of the British Constitution alone;
he interlards his dissertation upon this system by references to the laws of nature." Wright,
American Interpretations of Natural Law at 79 (cited in note 11). "[Hamilton] argues that
the proper solution of the present discontents can be secured only by a study of the princi-
ple of 'natural justice' and the 'fundamental principles of the English Constitution.'" Id at
89.
"' See Lieberman, Province of Legislation at 44-45 (cited in note 16) (discussing Black-
stone); Shannon C. Stimson, The American Revolution in the Law: Anglo-American Juris-
prudence before John Marshall 79-80 (Princeton, 1990) (discussing John Adams). See also
Charles Gray, Reason, Authority, and Imagination: The Jurisprudence of Sir Edward
Coke, in Perez Zagorin, ed, Culture and Politics from Puritanism to the Enlightenment 25
(California, 1980); and Gerald Postema, Some Roots of our Notion of Precedent, in Lau-
rence Goldstein, ed, Precedent in Law 9, 15-23 (Clarendon, 1987).
20 For a largely unsupported argument that John Adams's writings offer a sophisticated
reconciliation of custom and reason, see Stimson, The American Revolution in the Law at
79-80 (cited in note 19).
21 See Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law at 78 (cited in note 11).
22 See generally the literature cited and discussed in the text accompanying notes 25-
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cept of reason is very difficult to reconcile with custom.2" For the
discourse of custom is inductive, a discourse of the contingent, the
historical; whereas the discourse of deductive reason is a discourse
of the inevitable and the timeless. The discourse of custom is a
discourse of the peculiar and the local notions-of, for example,
"the rights of Englishmen." The discourse of deductive reason, by
contrast, is a discourse of the universal-of "the rights of
Mankind."
How then could revolutionary thought mix these two dis-
courses? Historians have made little effort to explain this confu-
sion. On the contrary, with a very few exceptions,24 historians have
hardly even acknowledged that Americans mingled custom with
reason. Rather, historians have typically maintained that Ameri-
cans were concerned exclusively with either the one or the other.
From the late 1920's onward to the late 1950's, historians com-
monly assumed that ideas of deductive natural law were the great
principles that shaped legal thinking in the later eighteenth cen-
tury, and that references to historic and particular rights were
barely plausible efforts to give the color of law to an illegal revolu-
tion.2 5 By the mid-1950s, a historian such as Clinton Rossiter could
'3 For various statements of the contrast between natural law and customary right, see
J.G.A. Pocock, Modes of Political and Historical Time in Early Eighteenth-Century Eng-
land, in Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly
in the Eighteenth Century 91 (Cambridge, 1985); Ernst Troeltsch, The Ideas of Natural
Law and Humanity in World Politics, in Otto Gierke, ed, Natural Law and the Theory of
Society: 1500 to 1800 201 (Beacon, 1957); Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historis-
mus (R. Oldenbourg, 1936); Kelley, The Human Measure 2 (cited in note 5).
", See Stimson, The American Revolution in the Law at 7 (cited in note 19); Wright,
The Early History of Written Constitutions at 360 (cited in note 4); and Otto Vossler,
Studien zur Erkletrung der Menschenrechte, in Roman Schnur, ed, 11 Zur Geschichte der
Erkldrung der Menschenrechte: Wege der Forschung 166, 186 (Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1964) ("In English political and juristic literature ... positive law, good
old inherited law, or saxon law is repeatedly closely bound up with or muddled with the law
of reason or natural law or divine law.").
25 For important works focusing on natural law, see especially Wright, American Inter-
pretations of Natural Law (cited in note 11); and Corwin, 42 Harv L Rev 365 (cited in note
10). The years between 1923 and 1940 saw a large body of work that took various ap-
proaches. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 Harv L Rev 49 (1923); Charles Mcflwain, The American Revolution: A Constitu-
tional Interpretation (Cornell, 1924); McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern
(cited in note 15); Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law (cited in note 11);
Wright, The Early History of Written Constitutions (cited in note 4); Julius Goebel, King's
Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 Colum L Rev 416 (1931);
Corwin, 42 Harv L Rev at 386 (cited in note 10); Barker, Natural Law and the American
Revolution (cited in note 13); Samuel E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, in Essays in English
Legal History 269 (Hambledon, 1985). McIlwain's studies provoked notable controversies
with two other scholars of the period, Plucknett and Schuyler. For a discussion of the McIl-
wain-Plucknett controversy, see W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional
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devote only a few pages to the rhetoric of English rights, preferring
to characterize the political theory of the Revolution as "a magnifi-
cent invocation of first principles," a declaration of "special trust"
in "the school of natural law."'26
From the late 1950's onward, by contrast, historians laid con-
siderably less emphasis on "first principles. 27 Particularly after
the appearance of Pocock's The Ancient Constitution and the
Feudal Law, the prominence of "first principles" steadily dwindled
in accounts of Anglo-American revolutionary ideology, and the
prominence of "ancient English rights" steadily grew. Historians
began to see the revolutionary lawyers as committed not to the
natural law abstractions of Enlightenment France, but rather to
the seventeenth-century English constitution and to the seven-
teenth-century legal order of the English countryside. They saw
them as "romantic conservatives," living late in the eighteenth
century, with legal values abandoned generations earlier in metro-
politan Britain."' This school of historians made little of references
to natural law.
Indeed, constitutional historians had come full circle: where
historians once read the references to natural law in the American
Revolution with avid interest and were merely puzzled or irritated
by references to the "Rights of Englishmen," they now read avidly
for references to the "Rights of Englishmen" and were puzzled by
references to natural law. By 1981, J. P. Reid could maintain that
the American Revolutionaries paid no heed to natural law, despite
History 30 (Rothman, 1955). For the McIlwain-Schuyler controversy, see Barbara A. Black,
The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U Pa L Rev 1157, 1157-61
(1976).
This emphasis on natural law during these years was, perhaps, a product of its time.
These scholars wrote at a moment when democracy and liberal values seemed secure only in
America and on the far western fringe of Europe. Thus, they naturally conceived of the
American and French Revolutions as belonging to a single, isolated "Atlantic Civilization":
the home of an Enlightenment tradition of universal liberty starkly opposed to the dark
German world of historical relativism. After victory in World War II diminished our sense of
embattled solidarity with France, scholars tended to see the American tradition as unique,
but still rooted in natural law.
26 Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American Tradition
of Political Liberty 326, 362 (Harcourt, Brace, 1953). For a discussion of the historiography
of the period, see Black, 124 U Pa L Rev at 1157 (cited in note 25).
"' This was particularly true, perhaps, after Peter Laslett's demonstration that Locke's
Two Treatises had not, in fact, been written in defense of the Glorious Revolution. See
Peter Laslett, The English Revolution and Locke's Two Treatises of Government, 12 Camb
Hist J 40 (1956).
2 Hendrik Hartog, Losing the World of the Massachusetts Whig, in Hendrik Hartog,
ed, Law in The American Revolution and the Revolution in Law: A Collection of Review
Essays on American Legal History 143, 163 (New York, 1981).
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the routine association of the "British constitution" with "the eter-
nal Laws of Nature." Such statements were less "appeals to natu-
ral law" than "boasts about the validity and perfection.., of the
constitution."29 Custom had once been read out of the record; now
it was the turn of natural law.
Most recently, the literature has swung back toward an em-
phasis on natural law.30 But surely it is clear that we cannot allow
the historiographical pendulum to swing indefinitely. It is pointless
to argue whether the Revolutionaries really cared about custom, or
really cared about reason. Manifestly they cared about both at
once, and not infrequently identified the two. What we lack is an
interpretation that can account for the oddly casual conflation of
the law of reason and the custom of Englishmen that prevailed
among American revolutionary lawyers and their English contem-
poraries. We still have not faced our ultimate task: to explain, not
what eighteenth-century lawyers thought, but rather how they fell
so far short of what we would consider clear thinking.
II. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF "MINGLING" CUSTOM AND REASON:
THE PROBLEM OF PROOF OF CUSTOM
To understand that failure of clear thinking, we must bring a
perspective to American history that includes continental Europe
and that extends back to the Middle Ages. America was only one
of many early modern legal cultures addicted to the same practice
of mixing custom with reason. This was a pan-Western phenome-
non; accordingly, it calls for a pan-Western explanation. Moreover,
it was a phenomenon with centuries-old roots. The chaotic juris-
prudential affairs in America was the long-term result of a collapse
of customary jurisdictions that began with the expansion of Euro-
pean state power in the later Middle Ages and accelerated in the
early modern period. This collapse made it impossible to prove
29 John Phillip Reid, The Irrelevance of the Declaration, in Hartog, ed, Law in The
American Revolution and the Revolution in Law at 46, 67 (cited in note 28). See also John
Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights
(Wisconsin, 1986); John Phillip Reid, In Defiance of the Law: The Standing-Army Contro-
versy, the Two Constitutions, and the Coming of the American Revolution (North Carolina,
1981); Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the
Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era (North Carolina, 1980). For a
survey of the literature along these lines, see Greene, 85 S Atlantic Q 56 (cited in note 14).
30 See, for example, J.G.A. Pocock, Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis
and the Ideologia Americana, 48 J Hist Ideas 325 (1987), discussing John Diggins, The Lost
Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (Chi-
cago, 1984); Isaac Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 Am Hist Rev 629 (1982).
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custom through the traditional procedure, by interviewing local
witnesses.31
For westerners from the Dark Ages onward, custom was the
fundamental legitimate source of rights. Custom formed the "basic
norm," the fundamental source of legitimacy upon which "legal re-
ality," the subjective understanding of the world as including
rights, was founded.3 2 What was not customary, was not right. But
what was customary could be determined only in local gatherings,
in which the local populace, or perhaps the local elders, could ar-
rive at consensus.
From the twelfth century onward, however, European states
began gradually to assert their power, slowly eroding local society.
As these states grew, they established learned
courts-ecclesiastical courts, princely courts, urban courts-in
which it was often difficult or impossible to consult local witnesses
who might testify as to the nature of customary rules. Yet the law-
yers who worked in those courts continued to treat custom as the
basic source of legitimacy. As a result, lawyers working in govern-
mental courts faced a dilemma. Custom, the traditional source of
legitimacy, dictated that courts consult local witnesses, but they
were unable to do so. The pioblem became acute in the early mod-
ern period, when governmental courts displaced local jurisdictions
on a large scale. As governmental adjudication became the norm,
31 In offering what could be called a "proceduralist" explanation, I follow the lead of a
number of legal historians who have tried to identify the procedural pressures that underlie
developments in the airy heights of legal philosophy. And like most of them, I concentrate
on the law of proof. See John Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof (Chicago, 1976), and
the literature cited in notes 42 and 53.
32 1 take the concept of,"basic norm," of course, from Hans Kelsen. I am aware that
Kelsen's formulation of this concept changed notably over the course of his career-so much
so, indeed, that the concept has been treated as more or less worthless. See, for example,
Richard Tur and William Twining, eds, Essays on Kelsen 8-9 (Clarendon, 1986); lain Stew-
art, The Critical Legal Science of Hans Kelsen, 17 J L & Society 273, 295-97 (1990). I am
also aware that Kelsen offered accounts of the place of custom in legal systems that differ
from the account of custom I will offer here. See, for example, Richard Tur, The Kelsenian"
Enterprise, in Tur and Twining, eds, Essays on Kelsen 150, 153. Finally, I am aware that
Kelsen used his theory to describe objective and not subjective right. Nevertheless, I think
the concept of the "basic norm" can be usefully employed here, in a way fundamentally
faithful to Kelsen's approach. See Hans Kelsen, Was ist ein Rechtsakt?, in Hans Klecatsky,
ed, 2 Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule 1381-93 (Europa, 1968). Within the historical
context I describe, in which centralized courts encroached upon the countryside, the com-
mitment to respect local custom did constitute a basic norm. It is true that this basic norm
had what Kelsen might regard as an "impure" origin, in political conflict. Nevertheless, cus-
tom was invoked to govern the norm-making of the centralized legal system in a Kelsenian




early modern lawyers found themselves almost wholly cut off from
local witnesses. Lacking local witnesses, early modern lawyers were
forced to seek an alternative means of determining custom. The
alternative they chose was to blend customary and natural law into
a peculiar concoction, which they called the "common custom of
the realm," and which they embodied in treatises that could be
consulted in lieu of consulting local witnesses. The consequence
was a thorough confusion of custom and reason, a confusion still
present when the American Revolution began.
A. The Middle Ages on the Continent: "Proving" Local Custom
In the dark centuries after the collapse of Carolingian author-
ity, the populace of western Europe resolved almost all of its dis-
putes in village and manorial gatherings. In such gatherings, the
local populace would arrive at consensus with little or no interven-
tion from centralized governmental forces.33
But beginning in the twelfth century, new governmental forces
appeared on the European landscape, bringing with them new
kinds of courts. Princely, urban, and ecclesiastical courts began to
encroach upon the western European countryside which had been
dominated by these local gatherings.34 To be sure, even as new
courts appeared, the local gatherings still survived. Indeed,
throughout the later Middle Ages, local gatherings presumably
continued to manage most dispute resolution.3 Nevertheless, after
the twelfth century, not all disputes were resolved in such local
gatherings. Some litigation, especially litigation involving large
sums and momentous issues, made its way into new governmental
courts staffed by lawyers trained in one form or another of learned
law.
One might suppose that the lawyers who staffed these courts
might have been hostile to local customary traditions. After all,
learned lawyers represented the sophisticated traditions of the
royal and urban centers. But, such was not the case. On the con-
trary, lawyers generally committed themselves to respecting local
33 For a description of these societies, see Peter Brown, Society and the Supernatural:
A Medieval Change, in Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity 302, 310-11 (California,
1982).
34 See the surveys of institutional development by Gunter Gudian, Die Grundlegenden
Institutionen der Lrinder, in Helmut Coing, ed, 1 Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der
neueren Europaischen Privatrechtsgeschichte 401 (C.H. Beck', 1973); and Winfried Trusen,
Die gelehrte Gerichtsbarkeit der Kirche, in id at 467.
35 See, for example, the remarks of John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal
History 26-32 (Butterworths, 3d ed 1990).
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customary tradition. This was, broadly speaking, true all over Eu-
rope. Learned lawyers (with the possible exception of Church law-
yers)3 6 declared that local customary rights should be respected by
centralized justice.37 Judges in the new courts were obliged to
swear an oath to respect customary rights.3 This commitment to
respect customary rights was, moreover, invested with definite po-
litical significance: learned lawyers declared that custom expressed
the "voluntas populi"-the "will of the people." '39
But the lawyers' commitment to respect "the will of the peo-
ple" was subject to substantial practical and theoretical limits.
Governmental courts could not apply customary rules unless they
knew exactly what the governing customary rules in any litigation
might be. And determining custom was no easy proposition. Cus-
'" For the attitude of the earlier church lawyers, see Andre Gouron, Non dixit: Ego sum
consuetudo, 74 Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung fUr Rechtsgeschichte (Kanonistische
Abteilung) 133 (1988). For later medieval attitudes, which were quite complex, see Richard
H. Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England 12-20 (Cambridge, 1990), and the
literature cited therein.
3 For the status of custom as "unlimited" in the absence of legislation (see also note 69
and accompanying text), see Pierre-Clement Timbal, Coutume et Jurisprudence en France
au Moyen Age, in 52 La Coutume 227, 227-32 (Recueils de Ia Soci~t6 Jean Bodin pour
l'Histoire Comparative des Institutions, 1989). The Milanese jurist Obertus de Orto, for ex-
ample, stated the principle of the supremacy of custom in very definite terms ("The Roman
laws are of no mean authority, but their force does not extend so far as to defeat usage or
custom."). Obertus de Orto, De Feudis sive eorum Consuetudine Mediolanensi in Jacques
Cujas, Novellarum Constitutionum Impp. Iustiniani Expositio 110 (Ioannas Gymniicus,
1569). For a. recent discussion of Obertus's statement, see also Gerard Giordanengo, Le
Droit F~odal dans les Pays de Droit Etcrit: L'Exemple de la Provence et du Dauphin6 126
(Itcole Franqaise de Rome, 1988). Obertus's statement reversed the sense of a famous decla-
ration in the Code, C. 8, 52, 2. For other Italian examples, along, valuably, with English
ones, see Andre Gouron, Coutumes contre loi chez les premiers glossateurs, in Andre
Gouron and Albert Rigaudiere, eds, Renaissance du Pouvoir legislatif et Genese de l'Etat
117 (Montpellier, 1988); for France, see Jean-Francois Poudret, Rapport de synth~se: Con-
naissance et Preuve de la Coutume en Europe occidentale au moyen age et a l'6poque
moderne, in 52 La Coutume 511, 513 (Recueils de la Soci6t6 Jean Bodin pour l'Histoire
Comparative des Institutions, 1989) and the literature in the following notes. The earliest
revivalists of Roman law had, however, a very different attitude, which is described in James
Whitman, The Lawyers Discover the Fall of Rome, 9 L & Hist Rev 191 (1990).
11 See Woldemar Engelmann, Die Wiedergeburt der Rechtskultur in Italien durch die
wissenschaftliche Lehre 90 (K.F. Kochler, 1938). See also Vincenzo Piano Mortari, Potere
Regio e Consuetudine Redatta nella Francia del Cinquecento, in 1 Quaderni Fiorentini
142-43 n 22 (1972) ("the judges in this realm are bound by oath to maintain both ordi-
nances and local customs") (quoting Rebuffi).
" See Ennio Cortese, 2 La Norma Giuridica: Spunti Teorici nel Diritto Comune Clas-
sico 101-239 (Giuffre, 1964). For France, where this view was represented, among the Orl-
anais jurists, particularly by Pierre de Belleperche, see Laurent Mayali, La Coutume dans la
Doctrine Romaniste au Moyen Age, in 52 La Coutume 11, 20 (Recueils de la Soci6t6 Jean
Bodin pour l'Histoire Comparative des Institutions, 1989); and Laurent Waelkens, La Th6-
orie de la Coutume 4 l'ecole de Droit d'Orl~ans (XIIIe sicle), 52 La Coutume 33, 35.
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tomary dispute resolution took place in local gatherings, presided
over by elders and leaders who sought to foster local consensus. By
contrast, governmental courts were presided over by jurists with-
out local ties, ignorant of local practices. ° Such men could not ad-
judicate in the way local leaders did, by assembling the populace
and engineering consensus through suasion and authority. Lacking
local ties, these jurists inevitably had to rely more on awe and less
on authority than did local elders and leaders.4' And without the
entire community before them, they could not supervise consensus
formation. They could only do what learned lawyers are trained to
do: apply some defined rule to the particular parties before them.
Nevertheless, these learned jurists set out to replicate the dis-
pute settlement of local gatherings and to apply the rules that the
local gathering would have applied. This meant, of course, deter-
mining what those local rules might be-a business referred to as
"proving" custom. Learned lawyers in the later Middle Ages spent
much intellectual capital searching for some means of "proving"
custom. 42 From the twelfth century on, lawyers in England,
France, and northern Italy widely accepted, in one form or an-
other, the proposition that some sort of testimony of local wit-
nesses was in order.43
Of particular importance was a procedure pioneered in thir-
teenth-century northern France. Called the "enqu~te par turbe, ' '44
this procedure required the systematic interrogation of local wit-
40 See Jacques Vanderlinden, La Coutume dans le Droit Fran ais des 'Pays des Cou-
tumes' aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe si~cles, in 52 La Coutume 271, 289 (Recueils de la
Socit6 Jean Bodin pour l'Histoire Comparative des Institutions, 1989).
41 For a thoughtful discussion of the contrast between law in the presence and in the
absence of officials with central authority, see Simon Roberts, The Study of Dispute: An-
thropological Perspectives, in John Bossy, ed, Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human
Relations in the West 1, 10-24 (Cambridge, 1983).
42 See S.F.C. Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism 2 (Cambridge, 1976)
("We may do better with our own questions if we try to understand theirs; and their ques-
tions were mostly about proof."). See also Wolfgang Wiegand, Zur Herkunft und Aus-
breitung der Formel 'Habere Fundatam Intentionem', in Sten Gagner, et al, eds, Fest-
schrift far Hermann Krause 126 (Bohlau, 1975); Wolfgang Wiegand, Studien zur
Rechtsanwendungslehre der Rezeptionszeit (Gremer, 1977).
43 A variety of forms are surveyed in Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 511 (cited in note 37).
For the important Italian tradition, see id at 537-39 and note 45 below. For England, see
Section I1D. The German-speaking world, as Poudret points out, should probably be viewed
separately, even though German solutions were in many ways closely related to western
ones. Id at 518, 539.
44 This procedure almost certainly had roots much further back in the Middle Ages.
See the discussion of Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 523 (cited in note 37) (disagreeing with
Laurent Waelkens, L'Origine de l'Enqufte par Turbe, 53 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsges-
chiedenis 337 (1985)).
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nesses. As one leading fourteenth-century French lawyer described
the procedure, custom was to be "proved by a meeting of ten men
worthy of faith. '4 A 1270 ordinance of Saint Louis laid out the
following details:
Several wise men, in good repute, are to be called. Once they
are called, the custom is to be proposed to them by the mouth
of one of their number. The custom having been proposed,
they are to declare and honestly transmit what they know and
believe and have seen to be the practice with regard to the
custom in question. Upon the swearing of an oath, they are to
stand off to the side, deliberate, and communicate their delib-
erations, saying among which persons they have seen the cus-
tom practiced, who performed it in what case and in what
place, if it has been the subject of a judgment and what the
circumstances were, and all of this is to be reduced to writing
and sent to the court under the seals of the inquisitors, and
they are also to be separately interrogated on what they have
said.46
This procedure was laden with political meaning. The practice of
interviewing local "wise men," as described here, was designed to
manifest scrupulous deference to the "will" of the local "people."
Note how this procedure dramatized the autonomy of the ten wise
persons testifying, leaving them free to define the custom them-
"' See Kelley, The Human Measure at 100-01 (cited in note 5). See generally P.
Guilhiermoz, La Persistance du Caractre Oral dans la Procedure Civile Francaise, 13
Nouvelle Revue Historique de Droit Frangais et Etranger 21 (1889). This principle was ac-
cepted in Italy, homeland of learned law, as well. The international learning was summa-
rized by one great Italian scholar as follows: "The Doctors [i.e. the learned jurists] declare
that witnesses are to be produced just as in other cases, and that they are to swear an oath
and be examined individually. Pierre [de Belleperche] says that laymen do not believe us on
this point, since they do not say that this sort of full proof is required; but rather only half
proof-i.e., that the judge shall examine witnesses and, drawing conclusions from what they
say, shall judge accordingly. . ." Wiegand, Studien zur Rechtsanwendungslehre at 114
(cited in note 42) (quoting Cino da Pistoia). For the importance of Orl~anais learning in the
development of this tradition, see Mayali, 52 La Coutume at 15 (cited in note 39).
46 Rene Filhol, La preuve de la coutume dans l'ancien droit franc ais, 17 La Preuve
357, 361 (Recueils de la Soci~t6 Jean Bodin pour l'Histoire Comparative des Institutions,
1965) (quoting and interpreting the 1270 ordinance). Compare the manner in which Jean
des Mares described the law in his fourteenth century Decisions: If there was no written
source for a custom, "in order properly to prove custom, usage or style when alleged, the
proof in question must be made and reported in turbe [the formal gathering of witnesses] by
ten knowledgeable customary witnesses, giving certain and positive declaration ["cause"] of
their depositions .... " Henri Beaune, Introduction a l'tude historique du Droit Cou-




selves, and allowing them to stand aside, without interference.47
There was great political significance here: By requiring no fewer
than ten witnesses, French lawyers obeyed the maxim "decem faci-
unt populum"-"ten makes 'the people'. ' 48 Deference to "the peo-
ple" is, indeed, precisely what this procedure acts out-deference
on the part of a weak, but expanding, royal government.49
This procedure of interviewing "the people" may, on first
glance, seem a simple and workable solution to the problem law-
yers faced. But simple solutions are rarely also workable, and in
actual practice, this procedure seems to have begun breaking down
by the end of the thirteenth century.50 Part of the problem was
human nature: at least some jurisdictions required unanimity,
which is never easy to achieve.51 But the deeper problems had to
do with the very design of the procedure lawyers had adopted. In
the case of simple, widely acknowledged local practice, the ten
"wise men" could easily produce a rule. But in all probability,
there was frequently no simple, widely acknowledged local
practice.
For, recent literature suggests, the very idea of a definite
"rule" had somewhat doubtful meaning in the local societies to
which governmental courts turned for witnesses. Professor Peter
Brown has described the law-making of pre-twelfth-century soci-
eties as follows:
[T]hese are small face-to-face groups. We are in a Europe of
low overall population where human beings were still cramped
into long-inhabited settlements. These settlements could be
populous enough in themselves, but they were isolated from
47 I should note, however, that "by the mouth of one of their number," refers, according
to one recent authority, to the rapporteurs of the custom, not to the customary witnesses.
Waelkens, 53.Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis at 339 n 20 (cited in note 44).
48 Adhemar Esmein, Decem faciunt populum, in 1 Mlanges P. F. Girard 457-73
(Librairie Arthur Rousseau, 1912).
"I This practice of consulting witnesses was a legitimating procedure, in the fullest
sense of the phrase: it was intended to legitimate the activity of a state that might otherwise
be regarded as dangerously intrusive. In so stating, I deviate from the concept of "legitimat-
ing procedure" in Niklas Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren 122 (Luchterhand, 1969)
("Legitimation is the institutionalisation of the recognition that decisions are binding.") My
treatment differs from Luhmann's in two critical respects. First, Luhmann treats "legitima-
tion through procedure" as a feature of modern liberal societies. See id at vii, 11. I am of
course invoking the concept to deal with a very much pre-modern and un-liberal order, and
to that extent am un-Luhmannian. Second, and most important, the activity of the state is
curiously absent from Luhmann's account.
" See Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 514 (cited in note 37).
" For the unanimity requirement, see id at 513. But see also the challenge by
Waelkens, 53 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis at 339 n 20 (cited in note 44).
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others by stretches of woods and poor communications. The
extended kin group is the primary unit of society, a fact stu-
diously maintained and defined by the blood feud. Safety and
protection still rested on coagulations of kinsmen and depen-
dents in small, intense groups.... The greatest explicit ideal
of the early Middle Ages is a minimal one of peace and, above
all, concord: this amounted to the maintenance of a minimal
consensus in a face-to-face society made up of evenly bal-
52anced family groupings.
After the twelfth century, to be sure, local society grew in sophisti-
cation. Nevertheless, much of what Professor Brown has described
would still have been the case. "Law," in these societies of warriors
and farmers, maintained peace and cooperation in matters critical
to communal survival: the avoidance of blood feud; the working of
common fields and the mounting of common defense;53 manorial
tenures.54 The emphasis was on reconciling quarreling parties, on
"lower[ing] the emotional temperature [by] thrashing out the
problem aloud. ' 55 It would hardly always be the case that these
societies acknowledged some clear customary rule. Local gatherings
would always give weight to traditional solutions, to the question
of "what do we usually do?"56 But for these illiterate people, re-
membering traditional solutions was not easy.57 Moreover, they
could not maintain consensus without flexibility:
What matters is the present decision, the choice made now.
That is guided or not by the past, but cannot be "wrong" be-
5 Brown, Society and the Supernatural at 310-11 (cited in note 33).
53 Paul Hymns, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law, in Mor-
ris Arnold, et al, eds, On the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E.
Thorne 90, 95 (North Carolina, 1981).
" See S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 99-116 (But-
terworths, 2d ed 1981); George C. Homans, English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century
(Russell & Russell, 1960).
8 Hyams, Trial by Ordeal at 97 (cited in note 53).
56 Milsom, Historical Foundations at 1 (cited in note 54).
57 See Hyans, Trial by Ordeal at 96 (cited in note 53) ("Because there is no accurate
memory of past decisions, each new case reviews the good old custom in the context of the
current situation."). A related point is made in the French literature: custom was "un-
formulated" ("droit non formul6"). See John Gilissen, La Coutume dans les 'Pays de Par-
Deqa" (Belgique, Pays-Bas, Nord de la France) (XIIe-XVIIIe sicles), in 52 La Coutume




cause of it. It is the past that must give way, and then the
present will have refined or modified the custom.5 8
When learned lawyers set out to "prove" custom by consulting
local witnesses, they were thus often asking the wrong question. In
matters of any difficulty, local law-making involved not agreeing
upon "the rule" but agreeing upon a peaceful solution. In such cir-
cumstances, it is not surprising that learned lawyers often failed to
get witnesses to produce any rule at all.59 Nor is it surprising that,
even when they got a rule, they did not always get perfect agree-
ment on that rule. In the 1319 case of Salvin Lombard against
Jean de Senlis, for example, both parties produced substantial
numbers of witnesses. But while Salvin Lombard produced seven-
teen witnesses to swear to his version of the "rule"; Jean de Senlis
produced only fourteen witnesses, of whom only six would swear to
his version. 0 In describing this case, it may be quite misleading to
use the phrase, "there was no agreement over the rule." Perhaps
we should rather say, "there was local conflict, in which Salvin
Lombard had substantially more supporters than did Jean de Sen-
lis."' To the extent the latter phrase is correct, the French court
that decided in Salvin Lombard's favor was not "applying" a
"rule." Rather, it was throwing the coercive weight of the central
government behind the stronger local party (or perhaps behind the
stronger local kin group).6 2
But the learned lawyers working in the 1319 court that heard
the case of Salvin versus Jean could hardly have accepted such a
characterization. The logic of political deference embodied in the
1270 ordinance of Saint Louis required them to defer to local cus-
tom. They were to enforce a local consensus, not take sides in a
local dispute. But the locals had not formed a consensus. Indeed,
"' Milsom, Historical Foundations at 1 (cited in note 54). Unlike process in court, the
legal process in these local gatherings, involved communal discussion that would seem, to a
learned lawyer, to ramble quite aimlessly. Hyams, Trial by Ordeal at 97 (cited in note 53).
" See the examples in Piero Craveri, Ricerche sulla Formazione del Diritto Consue-
tudinario in Francia 27 (Giuffr6, 1969).
o Discussed in Filhol, 17 La Preuve at 362 (cited in note 46).
61 This is particularly true to the extent that the witnesses summoned by the parties
were, like witnesses in the compurgation of the earlier Middle Ages, swearing not to fact but
to their willingness to support their kinsman. See Marc Bloch, 1 Feudal Society 124-25
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961). That there is, however, something more complex going on
in this dispute is surely suggested by the fact that only six of Jean's witnesses would swear
to his version of the rule. Clearly serving as Jean's witness (qua kinsmen?) and swearing to
Jean's right were conceived of as separate propositions by these witnesses. At any rate, it is
clear enough that there was no universal agreement on a rule here.
2 Indeed, the very fact that both parties produced witnesses, rather than the judge
engaging in inquisitorial investigation, was itself symptomatic of the decline of the institu-
tion. See the discussion of Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 528 (cited in note 37).
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the more governmental courts displaced local gatherings, the less
likely it was that consensus could ever form.
There was thus a worm in the rose of customary jurisprudence
from its very beginning. It was, in the last analysis, impossible to
abstract the substance of custom from the process of local discus-
sion;63 learned lawyers needed a "rule" that they could never count
on getting. The problem, moreover, could only grow worse as mo-
bility increased and local society began to break down in the later
Middle Ages.
Lawyers did have some escape routes. It was not absolutely
necessary for learned lawyers to consult live witnesses in every in-
stance. The process of interrogating witnesses produced a written
notation of a customary rule, which in theory courts could use in
later cases. Particularly in southern Europe, written compilations
of custom, in the form of charters or custumals e4 were used in lieu
of witnesses.65 Beginning in the thirteenth century, this practice of
using written sources appeared in northern Europe as well. 6 But
custumals were a distinctly limited source, for they were strictly
construed. They could only attest to the specific customs they re-
corded; a court could not apply the custumal to an unprovided-for
case.67 This created a most important difficulty for customary ju-
risprudence: the problem of gaps. The principle of strict construc-
tion meant that customary law reasoning could not resolve an issue
'" See Fredric Cheyette, Custom, Case Law, and Medieval 'Constitutionalism': A Reex-
amination, 78 Pol Sci Q 362 (1963).
" For convenience, I use the term "custumal" to refer not only to the northern cus-
tumals for which the term is typically used, but also statutes declaratory of custom. Not all
statutes were, however, declaratory of custom. See notes 65 and 66.
'6 The practice of developing written custumals was particularly common in the city-
states of Italy and Provence; indeed, city-states typically forbade judges to decide cases by
reference to any source other than written compilations of communal custom. See, for exam-
ple, Engelmann, Die Wiedergeburt der Rechtskultur in Italien at 90 (cited in note 38);
Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 532 (cited in note 37). Mayali, 52 La Coutume at 16-17 (cited in
note 39), discusses in learned detail the substantial difficulties lawyers experienced in ac-
cepting the notion of written custom-a notion at odds with the Roman tradition that cus-
tom was, by definition, not written.
16 See, for example, the discussion in Kelley, Human Measure at 102 (cited in note 5),
with citations to further literature. For the history of such written declarations of custom in
Italy, see Whitman, 9 L & Hist Rev at 200 (cited in note 37). Also valuable as a survey of
statutes declaring custom is Armin Wolf, Die Gesetzgebung der entstehenden Territorial-
staaten, in Helmut Coing, ed, 1 Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren
Europdischen Privatrechtsgeschichte 517 (C.H. Beck', 1973), although Wolf treats not only
such declaratory statutes, but also innovative legislation.
17 See, for example, Filhol, 17 La Preuve at 361 (cited in note 46); Guilhiermoz, 13
Nouvelle Revue Historique de Droit Frangais et Ektranger at 21 (cited in note 45). See also
the evidence of Rebuffi, discussed in note 82 and accompanying text.
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that a custumal had not directly addressed. Thus, introducing
written sources offered only the narrowest of theoretical exceptions
to the general rule that respecting custom meant interrogating the
locals. 8 Moreover, there were practical difficulties with written
sources. Charters-rare and valuable things that they were-were
not easy for litigants to come by. Many localities had no custumals,
and even the custumals that existed resolved only a limited range
of disputes.
Added to these practical difficulties were a pair of critical the-
oretical provisos that limited the governmental courts' willingness
to defer to custom. First, courts treated royal or urban legislation
as trumping custom.6 9 Finally, and fatefully for my tale, courts
typically insisted that customs would only be respected if they
were "reasonable. '70
These practical and theoretical considerations meant that cen-
tralized courts, despite their avowed deference to custom, must
have failed to apply it often. What, then, did they do? According
to juristic doctrine, in the absence of legislation, they applied gen-
eral law. This general law might be Roman or Canon law, which
had, in theory, universal application to all litigants, whatever their
48 Another important exception to the general requirement of live testimony should
also be noted. Some customs, lawyers held, were sufficiently "notorious" not to need proof.
Again, Cino de Pistoia may be quoted: "Jacques de Revigny concedes that if [a custom] is
notorious one does not allege it-such as the English custom that the eldest child inherits
all .... ." Wiegand, Studien zur Rechtsanwendungslehre at 104 (cited in note 42). For the
authority of the rule "notoria non egent probatione" ("notorious customs need not be
proven") in later medieval France, see Filhol, 17 La Preuve at 360 (cited in note 46); and in
Italy, Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 538-39 (cited in note 37). This was not, however, true, in
the thirteenth century. See Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 526-27.
But this exception, it is important to note, was probably distinctly limited. The notori-
ety of a "notorious" custom, at least in France, could probably be assumed only where the
custom in question was not challenged by either litigant. Filhol, 17 La Preuve at 360 (cited
in note 46); Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 526 (cited in note 37). But see Gilissen, 52 La
Coutume at 304 (cited in note 57) (custom notorious only if already known to judge).
" It should be noted that legislation at this time was unusual. For the battles over the
status of legislation, see Mayali, 52 La Coutume at 14 (cited in note 39); and the discussion
and citations in Whitman, 9 L & Hist Rev at 200-01 (cited in note 37).
70 On this tradition, see, for example, Frederick Pollock, The History of the Law of
Nature: A Preliminary Study, 1 Colum L Rev 11, 17-18 (1901); Thomas Grey, The Origins
of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
Stan L Rev 843, 852-54 (1978); and the comments of Albert Kiralfy, Custom in Mediaeval
English Law, in 52 La Coutume 379, 383 (Recueils de la Soci~t6 Jean Bodin pour l'Histoire
Comparative des Institutions, 1989).
This tradition, I should note, of course helped pave the way for the confusion I trace.
But in itself, it could only have led to the belief that isolated customs must somehow be
consistent with a system of reason. This tradition justified deviation away from custom, not
supplementation of custom. And only supplementation could claim the ideological force of
custom as its own. See note 109.
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local origins (especially in Italy). 1 The general law might also be
some compilation of customary rules from a prominent jurisdic-
tion, such as the custom of Paris in France.72 This general law was
to be applied, it should be emphasized, only when the existence of
local customary right could not be proven; if proven, local custom
"broke," or trumped, learned law. But proof was difficult, and gen-
eral law must have been applied frequently.
The resulting order was, from a political point of view, odd
indeed. In theory, litigants in a governmental court had a right to
expect that their local rule would be applied to their case. But ac-
tual practice in those courts was at sharp variance with that the-
ory. The purportedly custom-bound courts must often have ap-
plied learned law quite alien to the litigants before them.
This lack of fit between norm and practice was so striking that
one might expect to have seen a crisis of faith in the legal system.
How could courts declare their deference to local custom while in
fact applying rules drawn from expensive manuscripts produced in
Orl6ans and Padua?73 Nevertheless, it would not be surprising if
there was no easily discernible general crisis of faith in the Middle
Ages. In practice, so many disputes were still resolved locally that
there need not have been great tension between the norms of cus-
tom and the actual practices of litigation. The legal order was
therefore, perhaps, fundamentally stable in the early fifteenth
century.
B. The Early Modern Period on the Continent: The Evidentiary
Crisis of Custom
But in the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries came a surge
in the growth of state power, and the collapse of local society accel-
erated. As the great early modern states grew in weight and au-
71 For a survey of medieval legal systems and traditions, see generally the contributions
to Coing, ed, 1 Handbuch der Quellen (cited in note 34). Even when such learned law was
applied, however, acknowledgment of the normative supremacy of custom was made: the
opinions of the learned lawyers were viewed as having force of law only because they were
"custom" of the courts. See Engelmann, Wiedergeburt der Rechtskultur in Italien at 212
(cited in note 38).
72 See Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 516 (cited in note 37). See also the description of this
system in James Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic Era: His-
torical Vision and Legal Change 7-16 (Princeton, 1990).
"s For the concept of "legitimation crisis," see, of course, Jurgen Habermas, Legitima-
tion Crisis (Beacon, 1975) (translated by Thomas McCarthy). However, Habermas most
often has in mind more complex social orders than the ones I deal with. Where Habermas
does discuss pre-modern societies (see id at 19-20), I find his interpretation unpersuasive.
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thority, so too did governmental courts. 4 Courts multiplied, gained
in social prominence, and expanded their jurisdiction throughout
northern Europe. 5 Especially in the sixteenth century, governmen-
tal courts decided more matters, and ones of greater variety. By a
kind of hydraulic process, dispute settlement was drawn out of the
dwindling local gatherings and into the central courts.
As a result, the tensions already inherent in the medieval legal
order began to magnify. What had been a stable lack of fit between
norms and legitimating procedures became unstable. Theoretically,
it should be emphasized, nothing changed. The medieval system
survived, in its essentials; the primacy of customary law was still,
for the most part, accepted.76 But the local society that had been
the home of custom was vanishing. And where local gatherings
once resolved the bulk of disputes, centralized courts now resolved
them.
The result was an evidentiary crisis of custom. As local gath-
erings gave way to governmental courts, larger and larger numbers
of litigants found themselves in governmental courts in which their
customary rights were safe in theory, but were in practice impossi-
ble to prove. By the same token, larger and larger numbers of ju-
rists faced cases-often on novel issues-which needed disposition.
This was, it must be emphasized, an evidentiary crisis, not a theo-
retical one. Theoretically, customary law retained its primacy,77
but litigants, to their distress and outrage, had to produce testi-
mony from local witnesses whom the learned lawyers would ac-
cept.7 8 And those lawyers were, to their chagrin, bereft of rules.
74 See Filippo Ranieri, 1 Recht und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter der Rezeption; Eine
rechts- und sozialgeschichtliche Analyse der Taitigkeit des Reichskammergerichts im 16.
Jahrhundert 147-55 (B~hlau, 1985).
75 The reasons for this shift from countryside to governmental courts are uncertain.
The tendency among scholars, and my own tendency here, is to describe it as an aspect of
the extension of state power. It has been suggested that the accelerating commercialization
of society, which gave rise to disputes unresolvable by traditional methods, was also a factor:
"the changes set into motion by economic expansion and population growth were the funda-
mental cause of much of the increase in litigation recorded in Castile's courts.. . . Custom
. . . appears to have been unable to resolve the conflicts of peasants who were rapidly being
drawn into the orbit of urban life." Richard Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile, 1500-
1700 136 (North Carolina, 1981), though see also Kagan's qualifications, id at 137.
76 See, for example, Vanderlinden, 52 La Coutume at 279-80 (cited in note 40). Of
course, there were exceptions. See for example, Pierre Lizet's championship of Roman law,
discussed in Rene Filhol, Le Premier President Christofle de Thou et la Reformation des
Coutumes 126-66 (Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1937).
77 For Spain, see Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants at 28 (cited in note 75) ("customs
defeat the statute and have more force than law") (quoting Jer6nimo Castillo de Bobadilla).
78 Particularly poignant examples of the resulting distress and outrage have been pre-
served from the literature of the era of the German peasant wars. The peasants of Wtirttem-
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Remarkably, lawyers faced with this evidentiary crisis did not
abandon the procedural precepts of the Middle Ages. On the con-
trary, they generally remained faithful to medieval doctrine, even
in a sixteenth-century world in which that doctrine had ceased to
make procedural sense. But, in order to remain faithful to medie-
val doctrine, lawyers needed some new means of "proving" custom,
or at least some suitable means of supplementing such customs as
they had evidence of.
The search for new methods of "proving" or supplementing
custom became the governing task of the sixteenth and early sev-
enteenth centuries-particularly in France, the home of the great-
est of the new princely states. Throughout the later Middle Ages,
French lawyers had compiled custumals. In the middle of the fif-
teenth century, the French state had commanded the written re-
daction of all local customs in an ordinance that declared its will-
ingness to abandon the practice of interviewing witnesses as
completely impractical.79
However, French lawyers did not begin to redact local customs
until the end of the fifteenth century.s0 When they did so, they
remained obedient to medieval legitimating procedure in a variety
of ways. They continued to hold that custumals had force of law
only if accompanied by a record of oral testimony on the customs
in question.8 And they continued to require that issues for which
berg, for example, demanded in 1514 that "the doctors [i.e., learned jurists] stop interfering
with the courts and practices and old customs of the towns and villages, as it was in the old
days." Gunther Franz, ed, Quellen zur Geschichte des Bauernkrieges 51 (R. Oldenbourg,
1963). But the pattern was hardly confined to Germany. All over Europe, litigants were
horrified to find their fates in the hands of learned lawyers. See the excellent general discus-
sion in A.M. Hespanha, Savants et rustiques: La violence douce de la raison juridique, 10
Ius Commune 1 (1983).
" This was the ordonnance of Montilz-Les-Tours, in Isambert, Jourdan, and Decrusy,
eds, 9 Recueil Gnral des Anciennes Lois Francaises, Depuis l'an 420 jusqu' la r~volu-
tion de 1789 202, 252-54 (Belin-Leprieur, 1825).
80 For the initial decades of inaction, see, for example, John P. Dawson, The Codifica-
tion of the French Customs, 38 Mich L Rev 765, 770-71 (1940). See also the descriptions of
the French order at the beginning of the sixteenth century, id at 766-67, and Filhol, 17 La
Preuve at 366 (cited in note 46). For the French movement, see Vincenzo Piano Mortari,
Diritto Romano e Diritto Nazionale in Francia nel Secolo XVI (Giuffr6, 1962); Vincenzo
Guizzi, Il Diritto Comune in Francia nel XVII secolo, 37 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsge-
schiedenis 1, 1-7 (1969); Jean Gaudemet, Les Tendances a l'Unification du droit en France,
in 1 La Formazione Storica del Diritto Moderno in Europa, 157 (Leo S. Olschki, 1977);
Craveri, Ricerche sulla Formazione del Diritto Consuetudinario (cited in note 59); and
Klaus Luig, The Institutes of National Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,
1972 Jurid Rev 193, 203-207.
s1 See, for example, Filhol, 17 La Preuve at 368 (cited in note 46). For the medieval
tradition, see Section II. A.
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the new compilations had not provided be resolved through the
traditional mechanism of acquiring local testimony. As one French
lawyer emphatically put it, "when there is doubt with respect to a
custom, we must recur to a proper witness." 2
Nevertheless, in practice, the old medieval pattern could not
survive in its full form. The French lawyers did not redact through
the traditional interrogation of ten local persons. Rather, the
French monarchy entrusted the task to more dignified gatherings:
local assemblies, organized into three estates, which were to ap-
prove all customs in the presence of royal commissioners empow-
ered to "correct, add, subtract and interpret."83 Convoking local
assemblies in this way had the merit of honoring the political sen-
sibilities associated with the idea of custom, but it differed strik-
ingly from the old practices. Local dignitaries gathered under close
royal supervision were hardly the sort of local society that villages
and manors had been centuries earlier.8 4 To be sure, not all consul-
tation involved the formal convocation of a local assembly: it was
still necessary for French lawyers to consult local witnesses for un-
provided-for cases. But even when they did consult local witnesses
in the sixteenth century it was increasingly their practice to con-
S2 Pierre Rebuffi, Tractatus de Consuetudine, Usu, et Stylo, in 1 Commentariorum in
Constitutiones Regias Gallicas 2, 20 (Carolum Pesnot, 1576) ("We must keep in mind that,
whenever the interpretation of a law or custom is in doubt, we must recur to an honest
person ['bonum virum'], as Baldus teaches in consil. cccxlviij. ad evidentiam col. ult. in
secundo vol .... "). For "bonum virum" as referring to customary witnesses, see the discus-
sion in Filhol, 17 La Preuve at 357 (cited in note 46); and Mayali, 52 La Coutume at 22
(cited in note 39), and the literature there cited. See also the interesting remarks in
Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren at 61-62 (cited in note 49). Rebuffi strikingly al-
tered Baldus's original, which spoke of "contractus," not "consuetudo." See Baldi Ubaldi
Perusini, 2 Consiliorum Sire Responsorum 194 (Venetiis, 1575). (That Rebuffi did so re-
flects an important fact that I cannot discuss at any length: The contrast between "common
law" and "particular law" on the Continent was not just a contrast between "common law"
and custom, but also one between common law and any "particular" legal ordering-which,
in the eyes of medieval jurists, included the creation of "particular" ordering through the
formation of contract. That contract was conceived in this way only evidences, I take it, the
tendency to conceive all valid law as "custom" in a world in which custom provided the
basic norm. See, for example, Mayali, 52 La Coutume at 26 (cited in note 39)).
The "enqu6te par turbe," the special interrogation of local customary witnesses, sur-
vived until 1667. See, for example, Filhol, 17 La Preuve at 370-71 (cited in note 46).
33 The process is described at length in Dawson, 38 Mich L Rev at 774 (cited in note
80).
Moreover, the resolutions of estates may have all too clearly embodied the triumph
of the interests of one local class over another. In such circumstances it was difficult (as it
may already have been difficult in the Middle Ages) to view the redaction of custom as the
recording of shared beliefs, rather than as the intervention of central government on the
side of the stronger local party. See Timbal, 52 La Coutume at 232 (cited in note 37).
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sult local lawyers.8 5 Consulting lawyers was at best a dim echo of
thirteenth century practices, for, by tradition, lawyers belonged to
the world of state power itself, not to the world of local
autonomy.s6
This state of affairs presented French jurists with a dilemma.
In theory, custom still reigned supreme. But courts were not
"proving" custom in the way that their inherited texts instructed
them to do. By the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries, French jurists were responding with a mix of lamentation and
dogged doctrinal conservatism. In the early seventeenth century,
Gilles Fortin bemoaned the passing of the medieval rules: "[T]he
proof [of custom] was not in books but in assemblies of those who
know the practice and ordinary usage. 87 And Fortin's contempo-
rary Antoine Loysel, author of the leading work on customary ju-
risprudence, continued to cite the letter of medieval proof prac-
tices centuries after they had proven unworkable."8
Earlier sixteenth-century French jurists offered more creative
responses. To begin with, they defended the practice of using law-
yers as customary witnesses. One particularly influential figure,
Charles DuMoulin, insisted in 1546 that traditional customary wit-
nesses were corrupt.8 9 The use of such witnesses had oppressed
"many good citizens.. . in particular orphans and widows." 90 (This
was not just shyster's rhetoric: orphans and widows are precisely
the persons least certain of a kin group to support them.) Given
such corruption and inequity, there was no harm in dropping the
85 For this development, see Vanderlinden, 52 La Coutume at 280-82 (cited in note 40).
Compare also the accounts in Paul Ourliac and Jean-Louis Gazzaniga, Histoire du
Droit Priv Franc ais de l'An mil au Code civil 147 (Albin Michel, 1985); and Dawson, 38
Mich L Rev at 778 (cited in note 80). For the general rule, see Rebuffi, De Consuetudine at
38 (cited in note 82) ("[Thirdly, that the practitioners ['practicantes'] of the region for
which the customs are being redacted, be in agreement .... "). For "practicantes" as mean-
ing legal practitioners, see Charles DuCange, Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis (In-
stituti Regii Franciae Typographi, 1845) (s.v. "practicare") J.F. Niermeyer, Mediae Latin-
itatis Lexicon Minus (E.J. Brill, 1984) (s.v. "practicare"). The French ordinance upon which
Rebuffi commented here used the term "Practiciens"-again typically "lawyer" in six-
teenth-century parlance. See Huguet, 6 Dictionnaire de la Langue Franqaise du Seizi~me
Sicle 130 (Didier, 1965) (s.v. "praticien").
8 See Ourliac and Gazzaniga, Histoire du Droit Priv Francais at 150 (cited in note
85).
8, Kelley, Human Measure at 101 (cited in note 5).
Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 529 (cited in note 37).
88 Charles DuMoulin, Oratio de concordia et unione consuetudinum Franciae, in 2
Caroli Molinaei Omnia quae Extant Opera 690 (Paris, 1681) ("Many perfidious witnesses





traditional practice of interrogating customary witnesses. But that
did not, in DuMoulin's view, mean that custom need cease to be
the basis of proper law in France. For there was an alternative:
humane and patriotic lawyers (and such lawyers, if rare, did ex-
ist)91 were capable of producing excellent sources of custom. Simi-
larly, Pierre Rebuffi of Montpellier defended the use of lawyers as
witnesses by noting that lawyers had direct knowledge of custom-
ary rules from everyday experience.92
Nor did DuMoulin and Rebuffi stop there. In particular, they
took the critical step of abandoning the old rule that written
sources be strictly construed. Thus, Rebuffi conceded that recorded
customs were not in general to be applied to unprovided-for cases
without testimony from witnesses. But he nevertheless contended
that it was reasonable to extend recorded customs to
"similia"-"similar cases."9 3
DuMoulin went yet a step further. He proposed one of the
most influential legal ideas in Europea=s history: the idea of "com-
mon customary law."'94 His humane and patriotic lawyers could, he
argued, recover the common custom of the entire realm through
the compilation and comparison of all French customs. The result
would be a written source of custom, easily applicable in courts all
over France, which would not require the testimony of corrupt lo-
cal witnesses. 5
These jurisprudential ideas were in some measure strained,
but all were influential. In particular, DuMoulin's proposed "com-
mon customary law" made a great sensation (although not before
it stimulated heated debate).9 ' A large number of talented lawyers
91 Id at 692. The background to this is the widespread invective against lawyers in the
sixteenth century. See Gerald Strauss, Law, Resistance and the State (Princeton, 1986);
Donald Kelley, Jurisconsultus Perfectus: The Lawyer as Renaissance Man, 50 Warburg
and Courtauld Institutes 84 (1988). Compare also the observations of Luhmann, Legitima-
tion durch Verfahren at 112 (cited in note 49).
92 Rebuffi, De Consuetudine at 38 (cited in note 82) ("since the nearer you are ['vicini-
ores'] the better positioned you are to understand").
93 Id at 20 ("customs are not to be extended, except to similia, and when they are
favorably [suited to the purpose], as I wrote above q. iij. in x. differentia").
I" For a more general statement of DuMoulin's views, see DuMoulin, Oratio at 691
(cited in note 89) ("[I]t can easily be conjectured that all of these customs were originally
one, and that with the passage of time they have assumed local variations in different re-
gions; which variety is most lacking in reason and utility ... ."). On DuMoulin, see generally
Jean-Louis Thireau, Charles Du Moulin (1500-1566): etudes sur les sources, la mthode, les
idles politiques et conomiques d'un juriste de la Renaissance (Librairie Droz, 1980). This
idea had only the vaguest of medieval precedents. See, for example, id at 120.
95 See generally, Mortari, Diritto Romano e Diritto Nazionale (cited in note 80).
' See Gaudemet, Tendances at 167 (cited in note 80) (citing Pierre H6nin); see also id
at 181-82.
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in subsequent generations picked up DuMoulin's powerful idea
and developed treatises of customary law which they believed were
faithful to the spirit of France but did not require the consultation
of witnesses.9 7 DuMoulin's notion became, moreover, a favorite
both of the partisans of state-building princes' s and of their oppo-
nents. In particular, the customary law thought pioneered by
DuMoulin became deeply entangled with French constitutionalism,
embraced by the Huguenot constitutionalist combatants in the
French Civil War of the 1560's and 1570's.99 Customary law think-
ing of the DuMoulinian type survived into the French seventeenth
century, embraced by a wide variety of successors within the reli-
gious-political mainstream.10
These new treatments of customary law did not, it is impor-
tant to note, wholly free themselves from older suppositions. In
particular, just as local customs had trumped learned law in the
Middle Ages, the newly invented "common customary law" was
said to trump the learned law of sixteenth- and seventeenth-cen-
As one lawyer put it, the whole idea of a "common" customary law made little sense,
since witnesses often disagreed among themselves: "Who is going to explain to me this 'com-
mon reason'? After all, among two or three persons there are often thoroughly diverse and
contradictory opinions." Guizzi, 37 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis at 7 (cited in note
80). Customary law,'the objection said, in effect often failed to reflect even the shared un-
derstanding of a small village; how could there be any "common customary law" of all
France?
97 See Guy Coquille, La Coutume de Nivernais, Accompagne D' Extraits du Com-
mentaire de Cette Coutume 81 (Henri Plon, 1864) ("The customs of the provinces of
France, which are called customaries, are their civil and common law; and may be referred
to as 'law' if they have been determined and put in writing, under the authorization of the
King's commissioners, according to the consent of the people assembled in their three orders
(called Estates).") See Gaudemet, Tendances at 182 (cited in note 80).
09 See the discussion of DuMoulin's research as adding "luster to the French monar-
chy" in Donald R. Kelley, Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law,
and History in the French Renaissance 192 (Columbia, 1970).
99 See generally Donald R. Kelley, Civil Science in the Renaissance: Jurisprudence in
the French Manner, 2 Hist European Ideas 261, 269 (1981). Compare, for example Frangois
Hotman, Francogallia, Ralph Giesey, ed (Cambridge, 1972). Hotman, it should be noted,
was a moderate exponent of unified custom. "He is not content with the notion of a 'com-
mon customary law.' What he wants is the composition of a 'Code.' This latter is to be
composed with the aid not only of the books of Justinian ... but also of books of philosophy
... and of experience." Gaudemet, Tendances at 186 (cited in note 80) (on Hotman's Anti-
Tribonian).
100 Agitation for unification of a 'droit coutumier' grew particularly strong in the 1660s
and 1670s. Gaudemet, Tendances at 187 (cited in note 80). The movement maintained its
strength up to the French Revolution, and concordances of Roman and customary law of the
eighteenth century eventually made their influence felt on Pothier, and through him on the
Code Civil. Id at 189-90. See also Andre-Jean Arnaud, Les Origines Doctrinales du Code
Civil Francais, (Pinchon et Durand Auzias, 1969).
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tury France. Thus, for example, Charles Loyseau still assumed, in
medieval fashion, that Roman law would generally serve as the
suppletive body in the absence of attested custom:
Before applying the customs of Paris to other localities, one
should examine Roman law. If Roman law contains a clear
and final resolution of the point in issue, not repugnant to the
general custom of France, even if the custom of Paris is differ-
ent, it should be followed as the common law...lo0
Note the phrase "not repugnant to the general custom of France"
In it, we see something very closely akin to the Anglo-American
idea of "unconstitutionality."
C. The Seventeenth Century on the Continent: Custom and
Reason
In the seventeenth century, the DuMoulinian idea of "com-
mon customary law" began to influence the entire Continent. As in
France, scholars produced treatises of customary law in response to
the evidentiary crisis. 102 It is in these treatises on general custom-
ary law, which often retained a "constitutionalist" flavor, that we
begin to see, in full-blown form, the conflation of custom and rea-
son, the roots of which this Article is intended to trace.
For these treatises were full of references to "natural law,"
"equity," and "reason." This is hardly surprising. "Customary
common law," as I have indicated, hardly existed as such in most
parts of Europe. What existed were records of isolated local cus-
toms, the products of earlier interrogations of local witnesses (or
local estates) that had taken place long before. These records were
full of gaps to be filled somehow-and had to be filled by some
source that was not too offensive to the normative supremacy of
custom. 10 3 The lawyers did have some inoffensive options. They
could look to the customs of neighboring localities; Roman law; or
101 Guizzi, 37 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis at 10 (cited in note 80) (quoting
Loyseau, Traitg du Dquerpissement et D6laissement par Hypoth~que in Ouevres 6 (Paris,
1640)).
1*1 See generally Luig, 1972 Juridicial Rev 193 (cited in note 80). Also important is the
fact that, by the end of the century, as in France, university teaching of so-called "national"
law began-teaching, that is, of a "customary common law" essentially invented by scholars.
See Alfred de Curzon, L'Enseignement du Droit Frangais dans les Universites aux XVIIe
et XVIIIe sicles, in 43 Nouvelle Revue Historique de Droit Frangais et Etranger 209, 219-
20 (1919).
103 See Timbal, 52 La Coutume at 232 (cited in note 37), for a good discussion of the
state of affairs in this period.
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some source such as the Custom of Paris, which was traditionally
accorded a certain supremacy.104 But even when they looked to
these sources, the lawyers maintained that they were only pursuing
"equity" or "reason."' 1 5 In particular, they insisted that their use
of Roman law was simply "written reason."'0 6
With the invocations of "reason" in these customary treatises,
we have come to the crux of my tale. It is accordingly worth paus-
ing to dwell on lawyers' motivations for these frequent appeals to
"reason." The authors of customary treatises had, I suggest, two
motivations for appealing to "reason." First, they were proposing
to write about a non-existent subject matter, "customary common
law." It was natural to resort to that "formidable non-entity, the
Law of Nature,' 01 7 by drawing upon the amorphous body of "natu-
ral law" thought to date back to the Stoics (and beyond). 08 Sec-
ond, these jurists had, as it were, a legitimation problem. It was, to
the pre-eighteenth century mind, unlawful to make rules without
consulting customary witnesses; and lawyers doing unlawful things
need grand sources of authority. What these lawyers chose was the
vague and magnificent authority of "reason."
In any event, the recourse to reason came easily to them. Me-
dieval practice had long required that customs be reasonable.0' A
104 See, for example, Francois de Boutaric, Les Institutes de l'Empereur Justinien con-
ferges avec le Droit Francais (Gaspard Henault et Jean-Francois Forest, 1754), for a survey
of these traditional sources.
105 "[Tihat which is reasonable and just." Id at xii. For a similar statement from a very
learned non-lawyer, see M. D. P. D. C. [Antoine Lacombe de Prezel], 2 Dictionnaire Porta-
tif de Jurisprudence et de Pratique 150 (Leclerc, 1763) ("When the custom of the locality
maintains silence, one has recourse to the Custom of Paris, to neighboring customs, or to the
most general law and to that which seems most equitable.").
106 The history of this view of Roman law in France is explored in Alejandro Guzmfis,
Ratio Scripta (Vittorio Klostermann, 1981). The tendency to view Roman law this way was
also typical centuries earlier in the Middle Ages, among the first revivalists of the study of
Roman law. See Ennio Cortese, Lex, Aequitas, Utrumque Ius nella Prima Civilistica, in
"Lex et lustitia" nell'Utrumque Ius: Radici; Antiche e Prospettive Attuali, 20 Utrumque
Ius 95 (1989).
107 Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, in J. H. Burns and H. L. A.
Hart, eds, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: A Comment on the Commentaries and
A Fragment on Government 20 (London, 1977).
108 For surveys, see Hans Welzel, Naturrecht und Materiale Gerechtigkeit (Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1962); Michael Crowe, The Changing Profile of the Natural Law (Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1977).
109 The path toward the use of "reason" as a gap-filler was, I would like to emphasize,
merely smoothed by the medieval tradition of requiring that proven customs be "reasona-
ble." As discussed above, that tradition permitted courts only to deviate from custom,
not-what is ultimately at issue-to supplement custom. A court that merely deviated could
never claim the normative force of custom for its own activity. Nevertheless it is true that
both traditions of invoking the "reasonable" reflected the same pressure on courts to inno-
vate only while claiming the authority of "reason."
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jumble of Roman legal texts, moreover, had led medieval jurists to
identify custom as a "secondary" form of natural law. Drawing
upon this tradition, sixteenth-century lawyers found it compara-
tively easy to argue that "primary" natural law and "secondary"
custom had a "common foundation.., in the dictates of the natu-
ral reason of man."" Furthermore, there was an Aristotelian tra-
dition of arguing that long usage was the route to practical wis-
dom-the craftsmanlike "reason" celebrated in many Aristotelian
texts. Those lawyers who worked in this tradition could easily as-
sert that their craftsmanlike "reason" allowed them to extend cus-
tom without departing from the spirit of custom."'
All of these factors contributed to a tendency to resort to "rea-
son" as a supplement to custom. In 1597, for example, Loyseau
declared,
[O]ur customary laws ... are so different and so confused that
it is very difficult to extract from them a general and certain
answer. [Accordingly,] the law must be married with the prac-
tice, usage with reason: in short, Roman law must be linked
with our own." 2
An inkling of this tendency could be already seen in mid-sixteenth-
century France when Nicolas Bohier wrote of a custom, in a strik-
ing phrase, that it "shows by natural law that all men are born
free."" 3 And, as the influence of DuMoulin spread, so also spread
the DuMoulinian pattern outside of France. The tendency worked
its way, most importantly, into the writings of the great natural
110 This important development is noted by Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of
Society at 38 (cited in note 23).
" For the adoption of this Aristotelian notion by "topical" legal thinkers of the six-
teenth century such as Donellus, Cantiuncula and Hegendorffinus, see Vincenzo Piano
Mortari, Diritto Logica Metodo nel Secolo XVI 143-44 (Jovene, 1978). For a recent discus-
sion of this notion in Aristotle from a Straussian point of view, see Stephen Salkever, Find-
ing the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy 105-60 (Princeton,
1990). But see also Paul 0. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and its Sources 45 (Columbia,
1979) (emphasis on importance of practical rather than speculative intellect to some extent
properly humanist rather than Aristotelian). The tendency to regard the activity of jurists
as "practical reason" is, of course, almost inevitable and appears in cultures more or less
uninfluenced by Aristotle. For examples, see the Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragma-
tism in American Legal Thought, 63 S Cal L Rev 1569 (1990).
Also at work, undoubtedly, was the venerable tradition of describing custom as "altera
natura," discussed in the works of Kelley (cited in note 5). Nevertheless, I do not emphasize
this tradition, since it defined custom as something other than "prima natura."
111 Charles Loyseau, Traitg du dguerpissement, in Howell A. Lloyd, The Political
Thought of Charles Loyseau (1564-1627), 11 European Stud Rev 53, 53 (1981).
11" Kelley, Second Nature at 155 (cited in note 5).
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law thinkers of the lands east of seventeenth-century France. Gro-
tius's general account of the law of Holland, for example, is a clas-
sic statement of the procedural history that led to the introduction
of reason alongside custom:
21. Unwritten laws are old customs which similarly are either
general ... or local ....
22. When no... written laws [beschreven landrechten], privi-
leges, by-laws or customs were found touching the matter in
hand, the judges were from times of old admonished by oath
to follow the path of reason according to their knowledge and
discretion. But since the Roman laws ... were considered by
men of understanding to be full of wisdom and equity, these
were first received as patterns of wisdom and equity and in
course of time by custom as law.114
Here we have the classic pattern in its full glory. Judges were
sworn to safeguard customary rights. But where customary rules
were wanting, the judges had recourse to "reason." In typical sev-
enteenth-century fashion, Grotius identified this "reason" with Ro-
man law.115 Moreover, this "reason" was the stuff of "men of un-
derstanding," full of "wisdom." In short, it is the craftsmanlike
"reason" of the Aristotelian tradition.
Nor did the tendency die as the rationalizing seventeenth cen-
tury progressed. Samuel Pufendorf, the other classic natural law
thinker of the seventeenth century, maintained that the natural
law which he so systematically elaborated was still suppletive. For
Pufendorf, to be sure, custom had lost some of its claims. 1 6 But
even so, natural law remained suppletive:
[I]n all states natural laws support the civil law like a military
reserve, so that when the latter has failed on some occurrence
which altogether demands a decision in a human court of law,
there is recourse to the laws of nature and to the analogy re-
114 Hugo Grotius, 1 The Jurisprudence of Holland 11 (Oxford, 1953). Grotius's work,
which was not translated from the original Dutch until the mid-nineteenth century, was, I
should hasten to add, unlikely to have been known to many American Revolutionaries.
11 The reason/Roman law thus applied has, however, itself nothing other than custom-
ary force. This, too, follows the medieval pattern.
I" For Pufendorf's continued acceptance of the traditional order, according to which
custom trumped general law, see his description of the German legal order (drawn from
Conring) in Severinus de Monzambano [Samuel Pufendorf], Ober die Verfassung des deut-
schen Reiches 70-71 (Reimar Hobbing, 1922). This work, by contrast with Grotius's Juris-




sulting from their comparison, whereby, however, that which
is borrowed, as it were, from the law of nature takes on the
force of civil law. 117
Pufendorf's elegant statement represents the French tradition in
its seventeenth-century maturity.118
In "reason," Continental lawyers found a partial solution to
the evidentiary crisis. But it is important to recognize that it was
only a partial solution. Reason and custom remained difficult to
reconcile as a matter of logic. Lawyers could not always think of
themselves as exercising Aristotelian craftsmanlike reason. In par-
ticular, revealed religion was a powerful force in their lives, which
greatly complicated discussions of "reason." For many, though not
all, jurists, "reason" had to be reconciled with religious revela-
tion. 19 Thus the jurists could associate "reason" with humanist
concepts of "equity, ' '1 2 as well as with neo-scholastic concepts of
justice,12 1 both of which grew out of ideas of revelation.122 The ex-
perience of religious revelation had little in common with
craftsmanlike secular reason, and little in common with the experi-
ence of custom. Moreover, even when lawyers did have in mind
craftsmanlike reason, they still had much to explain. In "ex-
tending" customary rules, in however craftsmanlike a fashion, law-
yers were not consulting witnesses to determine the actual custom.
A lawyer simply was not a local witness. 123
127 Samuel Pufendorf, 2 Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo 161 (Ox-
ford, 1931).
"' For other examples of efforts to reconcile customary tradition with the law of na-
ture, see George A. Struve, Syntagma Juris Feudalis 1-6 (Georg Henri Oehrling, 8th ed
1703); James Viscount of Stair, The Institution of the Law of Scotland, 73-95, D.M.
Walker, ed (Yale, 1981).
119 Of course it is true that many, particularly early reformers, denied that reason and
revelation could be reconciled. See, for example, the discussion of Melanchthon in Harold
Berman and John Witte, The Transformation of Western Legal Philosophy in Lutheran
Germany, 62 S Cal L Rev 1575, 1617-35 (1989).
22 See Otto W. Krause, Naturrechtler des Sechzehnten Jahrhunderts (Peter Lang,
1982); Guido Kisch, Erasmus und die Jurisprudenz seiner Seit (Helbing & Lichtenhahn,
1960); Guzmfin, Ratio Scripta at 84 (cited in note 106).
111 See Welzel, Naturrecht und Materiale Gerechtigkeit at 89 (cited in note 108).
Iii For the humanist effort to reconcile reason and revelation-an effort alien to much
of medieval tradition-see Guido Kisch, Claudius Cantiuncula: Ein Basler Jurist und Hu-
manist des 16. Jahrhundert 47-56, 88 (Helbing & Lichtenban, 1970). Much of this effort
would presumably have been Ramist in nature. Compare text accompanying note 145.
1'3 Indeed, because the idea of reconciling custom and reason through a pragmatic con-
ception of the latter is so attractive, I should emphasize how little it offers in explaining the
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century history I trace. Two points need to be stressed. First,
while "reason" could be discovered through the lived experience of custom, in early modern
eyes "reason" had to be discovered by local witnesses, not by lawyers. This was precisely the
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Reconciling reason with custom presented one more jurispru-
dential difficulty. In the medieval order, custom trumped learned
law.124 Where, in the new order, did this trumping tradition fit?
There was real confusion over whether "reason" trumped custom
or vice versa. Domat, the great French systematizer, conceded that
the "Fundamental Laws"-the "usage g6n6ral de France"-might
trump such "Immutable Laws" as "Love God and love thy
neighbor":
[L]aws have their Justice and Authority, only because of the
relation which they bear to the order of society, and the spirit
of those Fundamental laws; so that if it happen that the order
of society, and the spirit of those fundamental laws, require
that some of the immutable laws be restrained either by
exceptions or by dispensations, they admit of those
mitigations .... 125
Domat's confusion over how to treat natural law and customary
law is noteworthy. As Continental lawyers reordered their jurispru-
dential assumptions in a world in which the historic procedures of
the medieval customary regime were no longer to be found, they
tended to commingle custom and reason.
D. Early Seventeenth-Century England
In the English world, too, the early seventeenth century saw
developments closely parallel those on the Continent. There were,
of course, pre-seventeenth-century developments of great impor-
tance in England. English seventeenth-century lawyers possessed a
great body of relevant medieval learning, just as French seven-
teenth-century lawyers did. It is possible that English development
paralleled Continental development far back into the Middle Ages.
During the Middle Ages, the same grand tension between local cus-
tom and governmental law practice that played itself out on the
Continent, played itself out in England. The leading historian of
the common law summarizes the early development of the common
law as follows: "Largely meaning only to enforce regularisation of
difficulty faced by DuMoulin and Rebuffi. Second, while custom and reason can be recon-
ciled through a pragmatic approach, what needs to be explained is why early modern law-
yers needed to reconcile custom and reason. Lawyers would never have been driven to at-
tempt a reconciliation of custom and reason if procedural pressures had not forced them to
do so.
124 See text accompanying note 72.
125 Jean Domat, 1 The Civil Law in its Natural Order 60 (Charles C. Little and James
Brown, 1850) (translated by William Strahan).
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[] customs, the king's court brought to an end the feudal jurisdic-
tions which had applied them, and had to apply the customs it-
self.'' 126 As on the Continent, the English princely courts tended,
by a kind of hydraulic process, to draw disputes to themselves. As
on the Continent, the princely courts committed themselves to
"apply" custom. As on the Continent, the initial English practice
was to determine custom through the consultation of local wit-
nesses-especially as organized into juries.127 Indeed, English de-
velopments perhaps did not so much deviate from Continental de-
velopments, as anticipate them. 2 ' The English royal courts
extended their reach in the Middle Ages with greater success than
did their Continental counterparts, and English lawyers very early
on adopted, in some measure, the characteristic ideological claim
of French lawyers-the claim, that is, to be applying only the com-
mon custom of the realm.129
At the same time, there were considerable differences between
England and the Continent. The actual consultation of local wit-
nesses ceased earlier in England than in France.' Moreover, En-
" Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law at 3 (cited in note 54).
127 Albert Kiralfy, 52 La Coutume at 401 (cited in note 70). For the general acceptance
of the common origin of the Anglo-Norman jury and continental custom-finding enqubtes,
see Poudret, 52 La Coutume at 523 (cited in note 37). See also Cheyette, 78 Pol Sci Q at
362-90 (cited in note 63). For the procedural world of the very early common law, see also
Milsom, Historical Foundations at 40-50 (cited in note 54).
128 It is far from easy to disentangle what was influence from what was independent
invention. There is no doubt that England developed differently than the Continent in
many ways. See Michael Lobban, Blackstone and the Science of Law, 30 Hist J 311, 317
(1987) ("[T]he English had a peculiar problem, in so far as their common law was a well-
developed system wholly outside the ius commune."). Nevertheless, as Professor van
Caenegem has pointed out, the differences are too easy to exaggerate, and indeed were exag-
gerated by the nationalistic legal historians of the nineteenth century. Raoul C. van
Caenegem, Procedure Civile Anglaise et Continentale: Problmes de Pgriodisation (Rk-
sum6), in 1 La Formazione Storica del Diritto Moderno in Europa, 149, 151, 153-54 (cited
in note 80). See also the valuable discussion of Gouron, Coutumes contre loi chez les
premiers glossateurs at 127-29 (cited in note 37).
"I, The description of royal law as such "custom of the realm" was at least as old as
Glanvill. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 15-16 (cited in note 35). Ref-
erences to the "law and custom of England" are yet older. See Kiralfy, 52 La Coutume at
381 (cited in note 70). For commercial practices and the law of common carriers as custom
of the realm, see John H. Baker, Law Merchant and the Common Law before 1700, in The
Legal Profession and the Common Law 363 (Hambledon, 1986). It is noteworthy that, on
the Continent, one English practice-primogeniture-had become a byword for a custom so
"notorious" as not to need proof. See note 68.
130 English and French developments are compared in Cheyette, 78 Pol Sci Q at 362-90
(cited in note 63). Unfortunately, this article exaggerates the extent to which French law-
yers, like English ones, had given up the practice of seeking out witnesses after the thir-
teenth century. As I have recounted above, French lawyers were quite definite about the
need to consult local witnesses well into the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, I am in general
agreement with Cheyette's argument.
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glish jurists carefully differentiated "general custom" from "local
custom," even in the twentieth century.'' The DuMoulinian argu-
ment that there was a single "general custom" embracing all locali-
ties could thus, perhaps, not always easily be made in the common
law context, and litigants in the royal courts ordinarily did not
confront anything as alien as Roman law. Perhaps for these rea-
sons, and perhaps for others, there may have been little sign of the
French pattern in the bulk of English writings before the seven-
teenth centuryl 2-- though perhaps Fortescue and particularly St.
German show the same pattern of argument that characterized
their French contemporaries. 33
But, whatever the importance of earlier developments, a sig-
nificant weight of English authority began to sound Continental in
the early seventeenth century. As conflict over the extension of
state power swelled in early seventeenth-century England, impor-
tant English lawyers showed the same concern about the impossi-
bility of "proving" custom as did their French counterparts.3
Indeed, many English lawyers hardly differed from Continen-
tal ones in their expressions of allegiance to the medieval tradition
requiring the testimony of live witnesses. The civilian John Cowell
stated,
It is enough for the profe of a custom by witness in the com-
mon law . . . if two or more can agree, that they have heard
their fathers say, that it was a custome all their time and that
their fathers heard their fathers also say, that it was likewise a
custome in their time.13 5
131 For the famous example of Kentish succession, see Milsom, Historical Foundations
at 11 (cited in note 54); and generally Kiralfy, Custom in Mediaeval English Law at 394
(cited in note 70).
132 See Theodore F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 277 (Law-
yer's Co-op, 2d ed 1936) ("[I]t is clear that in the sixteenth century ... custom had largely
ceased to be a familiar notion to the common lawyers, who regarded it ... as a troublesome
and perhaps a dangerous anomaly which must be confined as strictly as possible within
harmless limits."). I cannot state whether the concerns I chart in the following text were
new in the seventeenth century. If they were, however, we might reasonably hypothesize
French influence as the cause.
133 For this argument (though without reference to the Continent), see Vossler, Studien
at 187 n 130 (cited in note 24) ("To discern the law of God and the law of reason from the
law positive is very hard.") (quoting St. German).
114 It may be the case that what the first part of the seventeenth century saw was an
ideologically charged revival of what had been a neglected tradition of requiring local
testimony.
15 Kelley, The Human Measure at 100 (cited in note 5). For the attitude of English
civilians on this point, see Daniel Coquillette, The Civilian Writers of Doctors' Commons,
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Cowell might be dismissed as a civilian outside the common-law
mainstream. But in several cases in the early seventeenth century,
common lawyers actually did determine custom in the historic
way. For example, when Sir John Davies set out to break the cus-
tomary land-holding patterns of Ireland in the first years of the
seventeenth century, English officials, in this most famous instance
of conflict over custom, began by determining the customary prac-
tices by interviewing local juries and witnesses, just as the French
kings had done for centuries. 13 6 Likewise, the famous case of Day v
Savadge held that, contrary to long-established practice, the cus-
tom of the city of London had to be proven by a jury where the
city of London was itself a party:
[T]he Judges of every place are supposed to have knowledge
of the laws of the place whereby they do judge, and to have
customaries among them. And therefore in suits in their own
Courts do determine them, as the Judges at the common law
do in the King's Courts judge the general customs of the
whole kingdom, being the common law. And so in London by
special priviledge, they certifie also their customs of this na-
ture, into the King's Bench, which other towns do not. But
their customs, even those that are their local laws, are triable
by jury, if they come to issue in the King's Courts.137
Or again, in the midst of the English Civil War, the Levellers, in a
last burst of medievalizing ideology, argued for a time that juries
retained their law-finding character. 3 8 These examples testify to
the lasting strength (or perhaps the reviving strength) of the medi-
eval notion that law was properly custom, and that custom was
London: Three Centuries of Juristic Innovation in Comparative, Commercial and Interna-
tional Law 37 (Duncker & Humblot, 1988).
136 See Hans Pawlisch, Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland: A Study in Legal
Imperialism 69-70 (Cambridge, 1985). In the event, the English, following established medi-
eval doctrine (see note 70 and accompanying text), determined that the Irish customs in
question were not "reasonable." It is remarkable that the English felt compelled to stand by
medieval doctrine with regard to the interviewing of local witnesses even in a case in which
they were to abolish the customs in question.
'IT Day v Savadge, 80 ER 235, 236, Hob 85, 87 (James I 1615). For another bow to
custom, compare the invocation of the maxim "potentior est vulgaris consuetudo quam
regalis concessio" ("popular custom is more powerful than royal concession") in The City of
London's Case, 77 ER 658, 662, 8 Co Rep 121, 125 (James I 1610). The City of London's
Case is quoted and discussed in Julius Goebel, 1 Holmes Devise History of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 59 n 34 (McMillam, 1971).
M~ Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the En-
glish Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800 160-61 & n 24 (Chicago, 1985).
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properly to be proven by the testimony of witnesses.'39 Like their
French contemporaries Fortin and Loysel,14 0 early seventeenth-
century English lawyers had become conscious of the procedures
historically associated with the jurisprudence of custom.
Yet, even if memories of the medieval legitimating procedure
revived in the early seventeenth century, that procedure, in actual
practice, was long dead. In England, if not in Ireland, the "custom
of the realm" was not ordinarily determined by consulting "two or
more who can agree, that they have heard their fathers say that it
was a custome." The procedural norm and the procedural practice
had diverged in England just as they had diverged on the Conti-
nent. English lawyers, like Continental ones, accordingly had much
to explain. Indeed, the English legal literature of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries is rife with passages that seem to cry out for
some mild variety of deconstructive reading, so patently conscious
were their authors of the oddity of accepting the basic norm of
custom without consulting local witnesses. Thomas Hedley's 1610
address to Parliament exemplified the English lawyers' pattern of
thought:
[T]he common law is a reasonable usage, throughout the
whole realm, approved time out of mind in the king's courts of
record which have jurisdiction over the whole kingdom, to be
good and profitable for the commonwealth. But here because I
make custom a part in my definition of the common law, I
would not be mistaken, as though I meant to confound the
common law with custom, which differ as much as artificial
reason and bare precedents. Customs are confined to certain
and particular places, triable by the country, but their reason-
ableness or unreasonableness by the judges, to be taken
strictly according to letter and precedent, and therefore ad-
mits small discourse of art or wit; whereas the common law is
extended by equity, that whatsoever falleth under the same
reason will be found the same law.'"
Only the hardy will attempt to come up with a clear analytical ac-
count of how custom, reason, equity, and common law, as de-
scribed in such passages, differ in practice. What matters, for my
139 Nor is this surprising: this was an age when English historical thinking, like French,
was developing rapidly. See generally, J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the
Feudal Law (Cambridge, 2d ed 1990).
140 See text accompanying notes 87 and 88.
"I Speech of Thomas Hedley to Parliament in 1610, in Pocock, The Ancient Constitu-
tion and the Feudal Law at 272-73 (cited in note 139).
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purposes, is not the clarity of Hedley's ideas of the common law,
but their motivation; and their motivation was a concern with
proof-or rather lack of proof. Hedley still thought of custom as
provable through local testimony-"tria[l] by the country." But, at
the same time, he wished to claim for the common law the status
of custom-a proposition of almost baroque impossibility.
In this, Hedley's problem was, generally speaking, no different
from DuMoulin's. How was the "general custom of the realm" to
be "extended" when no record existed of a customary solution and
no local witnesses could be consulted? Hedley's answer was, in es-
sence, the same as that given on the Continent: the "general cus-
tom" was to be "extended" through "equity" and "reason." En-
glish lawyers had begun to develop an association of common law
with the law of reason comparable to that of Nicolas Bohier or
Pierre Rebuffi sixty years earlier.
Hedley's approach was typical. For example, Serjeant Ashley
declared in 1628 that the jus gentium "ever serves for supply in
the defect of the common law, when ordinary proceedings cannot
be had.' 142 There indeed was the rub: of course, ordinary proceed-
ings could almost never be had. More important is Sir Edward
Coke, by far the seventeenth-century lawyer most influential on
the American Revolutionaries. Coke accepted many Continental
doctrines of custom that had entered medieval English legal litera-
ture. 143 None of these doctrines saved Coke from the necessity of
explaining why traditional forms of customary proof were not re-
quired to establish "common custom." Thus he wrote: "[T]he cus-
toms and courses of every of the King's Courts are as a law, and
the common law, for the universality thereof, doth take notice of
them; and it is not necessary to allege in pleading any usage or
142 See Brian Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland and the
Union, 1603-1707 80 (Oxford, 1987). See also Bacon, De Augmentis Scientiarum, Bk VIII,
Ch 3, Aphorism 11 (Collier, 1900) ("In omitted cases, the rule of law is to be drawn from
cases similar to them, but with caution and judgment; wherein the following rules are to be
observed: Let reason be esteemed prolific and custom barren. Custom must not make
cases.").
1'3 For example, "consuetudo privat communem legem" ("custom trumps common
law"). See John H. Baker and S. F. C. Milsom, Sources of English Legal History: Private
Law to 1750 598 (Butterworths, 1986). See generally J. H. Thomas, ed, I Systematic Ar-
rangement of Lord Coke's First Institute of the Laws of England Matthew Hale's Analysis
27-31 (Alexander Towar, 1836). English tradition could be quite as cavalier with the Code of
Justinian as Obertus de Orto (see note 37) had been. See id at 27 ("longaevi enim temporis
usus et consuetudinis non est vilis authoritas") ("long-standing usage and custom are of no
mean authority")) (quoting Bracton). Like Obertus's statement, this daringly altered C. 8,
52, 2.
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prescription to warrant the same. 1 44  The question Coke ad-
dressed, whether law could claim, as all legitimate law must, the
force of custom, without the ordinary customary forms of proof,
was the governing question for lawyers all over Europe. What kind
of legitimate world could they have without proper "pleading [of]
usage and prescription," without going down to the manor or vil-
lage to ask the inhabitants what was right? Coke was only typical
in his concern with proof problems.
Moreover, Coke was typical in his solutions. This emerges
quite clearly in his famous 1609 decision in Calvin's Case. In a
well-known passage from that case in which he developed his doc-
trine of artificial reason, 145 Coke made it quite clear that his prob-
lem was the same as that of Continental lawyers. He quoted stan-
dard Continental doctrine on the unprovided-for case:
[It is argued that] for want of an express text of law "in
terminis terminantibus," and of examples and precedents in
like cases (as was objected by some), we are driven to deter-
mine the question by natural reason: for it was said, "si cessit
lex scripta, id custodiri oportet, quod moribus et consuetudine
inductum est; et si qua in re hoc defecerit, recurrendum est ad
rationem." ["in default of written law, one should abide by
that which has been introduced by mores and custom; and if
144 Lane's Case, 76 ER 423, 424, 2 Co Rep 16, 16 (Elizabeth 1 1596) (footnotes omitted).
Coke also declared: "in hiis, quae de jure communi omnibus conceduntur consuetudo
alicuius patriae vel loci non est alleganda" ("with respect to those things which are generally
recognized by common law, evidence of the custom of a given region or place is not to be
offered"). The Case of Monopolies, 77 ER 1260, 1261, 11 Co Rep 84, 85 (Elizabeth I 1603).
Coke's statement is quoted and misinterpreted by Christopher Hill, Intellectual Origins of
the English Revolution 251 & n 9 (Oxford, 1965). "Non est alleganda" does iot mean, as
Hill believes, "is not to be alleged," but rather "evidence need not be offered."
The last-quoted phrase raises a further question. Is Coke offering the established Conti-
nental doctrine of "notorious custom," typically used to describe English affairs? See note
68. It seems possible. But, of course, even regarding the common law as "notorious" custom
would not have solved Coke's problem, since it offered no solution to the problem of the un-
provided-for case.
145 For the importance of this doctrine, see, for example, William Holdsworth, 5 A His-
tory of English Law 478-84 (Methuen, 3d ed 1966).
The concept of "artificial logic" or "artificial reason" was not new to legal writing when
it appeared in Coke's work. Abraham Fraunce, an importer of Ramist logic and the author
of The Lawiers Logike (1588), had already proposed these concepts in the legal context
some twenty years earlier. See the discussion in Ralph Pomeroy, The Ramist as Fallacy-
Hunter: Abraham Fraunce and The Lawiers Logike, 40 Renaissance Q 224, 237-38 (1987).
For the importance of the literature exploring Ramist influence in England during this pe-
riod, see Knut Wolfgang N6rr, The European Side of the English Law: A Few Comments
from a Continental Historian, in Knot Wolfgang Norr and Helmut Coing, eds, Englische
und Kontinentale Rechtsgeschichte: ein Forschungsprojekt 19 (Duncker & Humblot, 1985).
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this is insufficient in any respect, one should recur to rea-
son."] But that receiveth a threefold answer. First, that there
is no such rule in the common or civil law: but the true rule of
the civil law is, "lex scripta si cesset, id custodiri oportet quod
moribus et consuetudine inductum est; et si qua in re hoc
defecerit, tunc id quod proximum et consequens ei est; et si id
non appareat, tunc jus, quo urbs Romana utitur, servari
oportet." ["in default of written law, one should abide by that
which has been introduced by mores and custom; and if this is
insufficient in any respect, one should draw upon that which
is nearest and most related to it; and if that fails, one should
observe the law which the city of Rome uses."] Secondly, if
the said imaginative rule be rightly and legally understood, it
may stand for truth; for if you intend ratio [reason] for the
legal and profound reason of such, as by diligent study and
long experience and observation are so learned in the laws of
this realm, as out of the reason of the same they can rule the
case in question, in that sense the said rule is true: but if it be
intended of the reason of the wisest man that professeth not
the laws of England, then (I say) the rule is absurd and dan-
gerous, for "cuilibet in sud arte perito est credendum, et quod
quisque norit in hoc se exerceat. Et omnes prudentes illa ad-
mittere solent, quae probantur iis, qui in sud arte bene versati
sunt." Arist. 1. Topicorum, cap. 6. ["he who is learned in his
craft is to be believed, and each should expend his labor in
that with which he is familiar. And all wise persons are in the
habit of believing the testimony of those who are well versed
in their craft."] Thirdly, there be multitudes of examples,
precedents, judgments, and resolutions in the laws of Eng-
land, the true and unstrained reason whereof doth decide this
question.'" e
Coke here offers a theory little different from those current a gen-
eration earlier in France. Like Pierre Rebuffi, Coke speaks of ex-
tending customs to "similia." And like both Rebuffi and DuMou-
lin, Coke takes jurists as his witnesses, "not," as DuMoulin had
written, "private persons, but leading men."' 47 Finally, like
Rebuffi, Grotius, and many others, Coke defends his customary
witness-like jurists by invoking Aristotle and the concept of
M Calvin's Case (James 1 1608), in T. B. Howell, ed, 2 A Complete Collection of State
Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the
Earliest Period to the Year 1783 607, 641 (T. C. Hansard, 1816) (footnotes omitted).
'47 Du Moulin, Oratio at 692 (cited in note 89).
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craftsmanlike "reason." Coke's famous, elusive doctrine repre-
sented, to be sure, an uncommonly thoughtful solution to the crisis
of proof I have described. But in essence Coke was tracing paths
already well-trodden.
And, like Continental contemporaries and predecessors, 48
Coke had produced, in the process, a body of thought that could
have been calculated to baffle later readers-a body of thought
that promiscuously embraced both custom and reason without any
superficially apparent grounds.
The same pattern continued over the subsequent century, to
include the other seventeenth-century English lawyer influential
on American thought: Sir Matthew Hale. Hale, who was notable
for his insistence upon the fundamentally oral character of English
law,149 showed the same historic faint embarrassment as did pre-
War lawyers. This showed particularly in his contributions to the
great common-law legal theory of the early modern period, the
mysterious "declaratory theory of precedent," characterized by the
formula, prior decisions constitute evidence of what the law is:15°
[T]he decisions of courts of justice . . . have a great weight
and authority in expounding, declaring and publishing what
the law of this kingdom is, especially when such decisions
hold a consonancy and congruity with resolutions and deci-
sions of former times, and though such decisions are less than
a law, yet they are a greater evidence thereof than the opinion
of any private persons, as such, whatsoever. 151
Much as this theory of precedent has puzzled scholars, it need not
puzzle anyone familiar with the history I have traced. The "private
persons" Hale declared to be unnecessary were the villagers who,
in earlier centuries, had served as the repositories of common cus-
tom. In Hale's insistence that those villagers were not needed, we
'4' Indeed, Coke was also like his English contemporaries. Coke's colleague and critic
Ellesmere, too, insisted that Continental and English law simply did not differ on the
supremacy of custom. Calvin's Case, in 2 State Trials and Proceedings at 670 (cited in note
146) ("wee concurre with the Ciuile Lawe"). But Ellesmere insisted on accepting the new
model jurisprudence: the "reason" to be used in defect of custom was no different from the
reason to be used in any other situation. See the discussion in Gray, Reason, Authority, and
Imagination at 30-31 (cited in note 19).
149 Kelley, Human Measure at 166 (cited in note 5).
150 For an example of the "declaratory theory," see Rupert Cross, Precedent in English
Law 24 (Oxford, 3d ed 1977). This "declaratory theory," which has vanished from the Amer-
ican literature, still appears sporadically in English opinions. For recent English examples,
see Reginald W. M. Dias, Jurisprudence 151 (Butterworths, 5th ed 1985).
11 Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England 45 (Chicago, 1971).
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hear a lawyer protesting too much. Like Rebuffi and DuMoulin,
Hale is eager to show why the decisions of lawyers-or, in this
case, judges-serve adequately in a customary system. In his con-
ception, judges are simply a species of customary witness; and
precedents are simply the testimony of a species of customary
witness.
It is beyond my command of the sources to say whether the
English, in facing the common western dilemmas, borrowed their
attempted solutions from the French, or invented them indepen-
dently. The question may be ultimately unanswerable, since bor-
rowers of nationalist ideologies always disguise, or conveniently
forget, their sources.152 Nevertheless, whatever their sources, the
English sounded like the French, not only in their theory of the
common law, but in their tendency to mix legal theory with consti-
tutionalism and ideas of popular will. One can quote Thomas
Wentworth-"The common laws are but custom, and wee claime
our liberties by the same title as we do our estates, by cus-
tome- ' 153 or indeed, John Davies, in whose statements Pocock
saw only an "unconscious kinship" with the writings of Hotman:
[T]he Common Law of England is nothing else but the Com-
mon Custome of the Realm[,]
[and] a Custome taketh beginning and groweth to perfection
in this manner: When a reasonable act once done is found to
be good and beneficiall to the people, and agreeable to their
nature and disposition, then do they use it and practise it
again and again, and so by often iteration and multiplication
of the act it becometh a Custome ......
And whatever their sources, it is clear, I suggest, that the seven-
teenth-century English were dealing with precisely the same evi-
dentiary crisis as were the French. By the end of the seventeenth
century, the English had produced a body of literature identifiably
part of a grand European jurisprudential tradition, in which, re-
sponsive to the evidentiary crisis of custom, lawyers had learned to
mix custom, reason, and the will of the people-a tradition that
united Coke and Hale with Domat, Grotius and Pufendorf.
152 For controversy over this question, see Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the
Feudal Law at 280-88 (cited in note 139).
1 See Mclwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern at 113 (cited in note 15).
15 Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law at 32-33 (cited in note 139)
(quoting John Davies).
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III. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: "MINGLING" CUSTOM AND
REASON IN ENGLAND AND ON THE CONTINENT
It is in this hopeless seventeenth-century love of unprovable
custom that we can see the roots of eighteenth-century "mingling"
jurisprudence. By the eighteenth century, the problems of proof
that motivated the authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries seem to have been forgotten. With Louis XIV's abolition of
the old practice of interrogating local witnesses in 166715 5-and,
more broadly, the great surge of intellectual innovation at the end
of the seventeenth century' 56-the tradition of customary proof
that had been present in seventeenth-century minds was, as far as
one can judge, generally lost from sight. 57
But if problems of proof had been forgotten, a pattern of
mingling reason and custom had been set-a pattern ready to im-
press itself upon the minds of readers of the classic legal literature
of the seventeenth century. Moreover, it was a pattern ready to be
misinterpreted in a variety of ways. By the eighteenth century, the
concept of "reason" had profoundly changed. The deductive tradi-
tion associated with Descartes and Grotius had established itself
powerfully. Accordingly, when eighteenth-century lawyers spoke of
"reason," they most often meant, not craftsmanlike reason, nor re-
vealed truth, but the activity of reasoning from first principles. Re-
call the quote of Louis Boullenois at the beginning of this Article.
Boullenois, still attempting in DuMoulinian fashion to produce a
common custumal for all France, took Descartes as his guide:
I recalled the method practiced once upon a time by M.
Descartes to arrive at the philosophical verities he sought; and
I persuaded myself that the Jurist could do the same in order
to discover the verities of Justice .... If one were to compare
the various customs [of France], one would be in a position to
form a Plan of Universal Jurisprudence .... 18
188 For the abolition, see, for example, Filhol, 17 La Preuve at 370-71 (cited in note 46).
188 See Paul Hazard, The European Mind: The Critical Years, 1680-1715 (Fordham,
1990).
157 For helpful observations on the eighteenth-century end of the tradition I have de-
scribed, distinguishing intriguingly among Prussian, Austrian and Italian strains, see Gio-
vanni Tarello, La crisi del diritto comane nel secolo XVIII: un problema storiografico, in
Danilo Segoloni, ed, IL Diritto Comune e la Tradizione Giuridica Europea: Atti del Con-
vegno di Studi in Onore di Giuseppe Ermini 433-41 (Libreria Universitaria, 1980).
1 Boullenois, Dissertations sur des Questions qui Naissent de la Contrarigtg des Loix
et des Coutumes at xiv, xxii (cited in note 2). On Boullenois, see Abr~g de la Vie de Maitre
Louis Boullenois, Avocat, in Louis Boullenois, 1 Trait de la Personnalitt et de la RaLit
des Loix, Coutumes ou Statuts xvi-xxiv (Guillaume Desprez, 1766); 5 Biographie Univer-
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This was a strange marriage indeed of Descartes and DuMoulin.
Nor was Boullenois alone. Frangois Bourjon, another eighteenth-
century custumal compiler, was slightly more faithful to sixteenth-
century tradition. But he too betrayed the influence of the new
ideas of reason. Describing, in 1747, the need to "fill the voids in
the body of custom," Bourjon methodically attempted to "reduce
custom and its assumptions to its principles and decisions ....
[T]hose principles have, by their nature, a majestic simplicity, and
if custom were not reduced to those principles it would be impossi-
ble to arrive at the general point of view which is the soul of juris-
prudence ..... 15 Lawyers like Boullenois and Bourjon mingled
custom and deductive reason, not because of any deep impulse of
jurisprudential logic but because they were still working in a six-
teenth-century tradition of customary law scholarship in an age
when "reason" had assumed new connotations.
Boullenois and Bourjon were, it should be said, not typical of
France. In the bulk of French legal literature there was relatively
little mingling of custom and reason. The pattern is noticeably ab-
sent in the writings of Montesquieu, as well as in the work of de-
ductive natural law text-writers like Burlamaqui and Vattel.16° But
the same was not true in England, in Germany, or in colonial
America. In those countries, the mingling pattern continued, just
as it did in the writings of Boullenois and Bourjon.
In England, the pattern was particularly evident in Black-
stone's Commentaries, themselves an English product of the Eu-
rope-wide movement to produce evidence of customary law in trea-
tise form. 161 Scholars have long been baffled by Blackstone's use of
selle (Michaud) Ancienne et Moderne 247-48 (Madame C. Desplaces, 2d ed 1854) (Boulle-
nois's capsule biographic entry in an undated collection).
9 Francois Bourion, Dissertation sur l'Union du Droit Commun de la France avec la
Coutume de Paris, in Francois Bourjon, 1 Le Droit Commun de la France et la Coutume de
Paris Rduits en Principes (1747) (unpaginated dissertation). The quoted passages are
taken from an eight-step method laid out by Bourjon which was to result in the exposition
of the "natural order" of French customs as "M. Domat has done for Roman law."
"' In particular, of course, they began to emphasize reason to the exclusion of any
other value. The ultimate result, by the early nineteenth century, was a legitimating doc-
trine which Lubmann attributes to all liberal societies, but which was surely specifically
French during that period. Luhmann refers to Guizot: "The core of all classical procedural
doctrine is the reference to truth or justice as a goal. [As Guizot said,] 'All of the elements of
the political machine must be designed, on the one hand, to extract from society all of the
reason, justice, truth it possesses, in order to apply [these virtues] to its government. . .. ' "
Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren at 18 (cited in note 49). To the (perhaps limited)
extent that Luhmann is discussing the use of "reason" as a legitimating concept, the tale, I
hope I have shown, is much more complex than Luhmann's readers might suppose.
"' For Blackstone's place in international context, see John Cairns, Blackstone, an En-
glish Institutist: Legal Literature and te Rise of the Nation State, 4 Oxford J Legal Stud
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the concept "natural law"; 162 by his discussion of the relation of
"custom," "precedent" and "reason"; 1 3 and by his classic state-
ment of the declaratory theory of precedent. 6 4 The uncertainty
among Blackstone scholars reflects uncertainty in the tradition to
which Blackstone belonged. This uncertainty was inevitable in a
tradition which used a fundamentally medieval vocabulary of cus-
tom in a world from which medieval proof practices had vanished,
and in which "reason" had entered the realm of first principles.
The same is arguably true of the notorious problem of whether
Blackstone did or did not accept the idea that statutes could be
"unconstitutional."'6 5 Like Domat and other Continental lawyers,
Blackstone still believed, in some measure, in the medieval idea of
"trumping." But he was unsure which, if any, of the types of law
318 (1984); Alan Watson, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 97 Yale L J 795
(1988).
142 For recent examples of the venerable tendency to minimize Blackstone's references
to natural law, see Lobban, 30 Hist J at 326 (cited in note 128) ("Although Blackstone
asserted the key notion that all laws against reason are void, he used the idea in Coke's
sense that one could not assign the reason of any particular law, since it was lost in the
mists of time. It was not the reason of individuals that could criticise law, but the authority
of ages."); Grey, 30 Stan L Rev at 859-60 (cited in note 70) ("Blackstone's popularity can be
attributed to his smooth transformation of the crabbed particularities of the English law
into the abstract and universal language demanded by the intellectual fashions of the En-
lightenment. His theoretical bow to the ultimate supremacy of natural law was dictated by
the same fashions .... ).
Others have asserted that natural law played a central role in Blackstone's thought, but
these latter scholars have not agreed on just what that central role might have been. See
John Finnis, Blackstone's Theoretical Intentions, 12 Natural L F 163 (1967); H.L.A. Hart,
Blackstone's Use of the Law of Nature, 1956 Butterworth's S African L Rev 169.
143 William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Law of England 69-70 (Chicago, 1979).
See Lieberman, Province of Legislation at 44 (cited in note 16).
1 Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 68-69 (cited in note 163) ("As to general customs, or
the common law, properly so called; this is that law, by which proceedings and determina-
tions in the king's ordinary courts of justice are guided and directed .... [H]ow are these
customs or maxims to be known, and by whom is their validity to be determined? The
answer is, by the judges in the several courts of justice. They are the depositary of the laws;
the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an oath to
decide according to the law of the land.... [T]hese judicial decisions are the principal and
most authoritative evidence, that can be given ... of the common law.").
"I See one of Blackstone's passages that has puzzled many historians of parliamentary
supremacy:
"[A]cts of parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no validity; and if
there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory
to common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void.... But
if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know
of no power that can control it ......
Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 91 (cited in note 163). This facially self-contradictory pas-
sage was typical of the later eighteenth century, when the "trumping" tradition still sur-
vived in a legal environment alien to medieval legal assumptions.
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he knew "trumped" the others. To be sure, Blackstone was a
thoughtful lawyer, who (like Hale before him) brought great agility
to the task of reconciling custom and reason.166 Nevertheless, it
was a task he faced only because he, like his Continental contem-
poraries, faced a tradition that mixed terminology about "reason"
and "custom," none of which had clear meaning in the eighteenth-
century world.
The seventeenth-century tradition found a readership as well
in the provincial corner of the eighteenth century world that was
America. As the Revolution approached, American colonists read,
of course, much that did not grow out of the tradition I have de-
scribed-for example, Montesquieu, and the deductive treatise-
writers Vattel and Burlamaqui. 167 But they also read much seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century literature that embodied the mix
of custom and reason I have traced: for example, Pufendorf, Coke,
Hale, and Blackstone. As a result, when the colonists applied the
deductive idea of reason they learned from their eighteenth-cen-
tury readings, they applied it within the mingling tradition of the
seventeenth century. The result was the strange body of thought of
which I began by surveying, a body of thought much in the spirit
of Boullenois and Bourjon. It was this mix of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century thought that informed Roger Sherman's decla-
ration that "[t]he Colonies adopt the common Law, not as the
common Law, but as the highest Reason," and that informed Otis's
frantic efforts to reconcile common law and natural law.'6 8 It was
this confused thought that led five states to preface their constitu-
tions with "a jarring but exciting combination of . . .universal
principles with a motley collection of common law proce-
dures .... "69 In this typically early modern thought, embody-
ing as it did a medieval vocabulary, reworked for use in a seven-
teenth-century world, lay the roots of chaotic American legal
thought.
CONCLUSION
What had happened over the course of the several centuries I
have discussed? From the beginning, lawyers in governmental
"I I refer again to the discussions of Lieberman, Province of Legislation at 44-45 (cited
in note 16); and Postema, Some Roots of our Notion of Precedent at 152-53 (cited in note
19).
1.7 For the dating of the rise of natural law thought in America, see Wright, American
Interpretations of Natural Law at 36-61 (cited in note 11).
168 See Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 at 9 (cited in note 15).
"' Id at 271.
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courts had accepted the basic norm of custom and embraced a le-
gitimating procedure geared to that basic norm: the consultation of
local witnesses. That procedure, however, was difficult to apply
from the outset. With the collapse of local society, and the explo-
sion of governmental jurisdiction in the sixteenth century, it be-
came clear that proper legitimating procedure was not being ap-
plied, and indeed could not be applied, in a preponderant part of
European litigation. Nevertheless, lawyers stood by the basic norm
of custom. Conscious of the impossibility of applying the old pro-
cedure, however, they substituted new law-finding procedures. In
particular, they "extended" recorded customs to "similar cases"
and applied "reason" and "natural law" to fill gaps in the custom-
ary system.
The result was a jurisprudence that constituted a Europe-wide
pretense: the pretense that law was still fundamentally customary,
even though no local witness had been consulted for generations.
In this literature of legal pretense, custom and reason were min-
gled, not because any inner jurisprudential logic linked them, but
because of the requirements of the pretense itself. This literature
of legal pretense lingered in the eighteenth century long after the
procedural problems that had given rise to it were forgotten, and
long after the concept of "reason" had entered upon highly deduc-
tivist paths of development. Eighteenth-century lawyers read the
old literature, though they did not perfectly understand it. As a
result, eighteenth-century authors repeated the century-old pat-
terns of mingling custom and reason, without any evident memory
of the procedural reasons for those patterns.
Jurisprudential thinking, in this history, did not simply arise
from, nor did it accommodate itself easily to, the institutional or-
dering. Jurisprudential thinking did not even legitimate institu-
tional ordering in any very satisfactory way. Rather, the jurispru-
dential pattern I have traced arose because there was no easy way
for lawyers to justify their institutions. It arose, as it were, not in
the interstices of procedure, but in the painful gap between legiti-
mative needs and procedural impossibilities. And when it arose, it
took the form of an improvisatory hash of ideas, which no amount
of ingenious argument will ever turn into a body of logically rea-
soned jurisprudence.
As for the legal historiography of the American Revolution:
the tale I have told suggests what was perhaps already obvious
enough. There is little point in trying to identify the underlying
logic of American legal thinking in the revolutionary era. That le-
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gal thinking was a confused m6lange, the product of centuries of
jurisprudential improvisation in the face of centuries of complex
institutional change. Accordingly, there is little hope of drawing
clear guidelines for concepts such as "constitutionality" or "rights"
from the legal world of the eighteenth century. To be sure, it is
possible to some extent to trace the idea of "unconstitutionality"
to the "trumping" character of custom in later medieval Europe;
and the oath required of American judges can be linked to the oath
required of ius commune judges centuries earlier. But that does
not show what Americans believed "unconstitutionality" to entail.
On the contrary, American presuppositions about constitution,
custom, common law and natural law, and their mutual "trump-
ing" power, were unconquerably vague, ripped as they were from
procedural context.
Studies that purport to explain the Founders' conception of
the Constitution7 " are thus doomed to mislead. Such studies per-
haps deserve the same disrepute that has become the lot of studies
of original intent of the drafters of this or that eighteenth-century
document.1' 1 If we cannot understand what the revolutionary era
lawyers meant by "constitution" or "rights," still less can we iden-
tify any single deep jurisprudential tendency behind their writings.
The Revolution was not "about" reason; nor was it "about" cus-
tomary rights. We must accept the fact that the American Revolu-
tion, like most such upheavals, was inspired by a poorly-digested
170 For examples of studies of the general jurisprudential assumptions of the revolution-
ary era, see Grey, 30 Stan L Rev at 843 (cited in note 70); Grey, The Original Understand-
ing and the Unwritten Constitution, in Neil York, ed, Toward a More Perfect Union: Six
Essays on the Constitution 145 (Brigham Young, 1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U Chi L Rev 1127 (1987). Also in the same tradition, but less
susceptible to my objections here, is Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Origi-
nal Intent, 98 Harv L Rev 885 (1985).
171 For objections to original intent scholarship, see, for example, the essays collected in
Jack Rakove, Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate Over Original Intent (Northeast-
ern, 1990); and William Nelson, 1966: Constitutional History, in William Nelson and John
P. Reid, eds, The Literature of American Legal History 95, 118-24 (Oceana, 1985).
The most interesting examples of the genre are not necessarily the best known. For
noteworthy studies of original intent, see Harold Chesnin and Geoffrey Hazard, Chancery
Procedure and the Seventh Amendment: Jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791,
83 Yale L J 999 (1974), and the response by John Langbein, Fact Finding in the English
Court of Chancery: A Rebuttal, 83 Yale L J 1620 (1974). Probably the most influential
study of original intent ever published in the United States was Charles Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv L Rev 49 (1923). For the
influence of Warren's article, see Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles iv
(W. Hein, 1987); and Erie R. Co. v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 73 n 5 (1938).
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farrago of ideas, without inner logic-by a confused body of law
that will never provide us with any single authoritative doctrinal
legacy.
